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arXiv 1910.08607cs.PL
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用安全的护身符驱逐幽灵

Exorcising Spectres with Secure Compilers

Marco Patrignani, Marco Guarnieri

摘要:

攻击者可以通过利用Spectre攻击的推测性执行指令的副作用来访问程序的敏感信息。为了减轻这些攻击,流行的编译器部署了广泛的对策。然而,这些对策的安全性尚未确定:虽然其中一些被认为是安全的,但其他的被认为是不安全的,并导致易受攻击的程序。为了推理这些编译器插入的对策的安全保证,本文提出了一个框架,包括几个安全的编译标准时,编译器产生的代码抵抗Spectre攻击的特征。有了这个框架,我们执行一个全面的安全性分析编译器级对策,对Spectre攻击实施主要编译器。这项工作提供了坚实的基础,正式理由的安全性编译器级对策,以防止Spectre攻击,以及第一次证明的安全性和不安全性的对策。

英文摘要:

Attackers can access sensitive information of programs by exploiting the side-effects of speculatively-executed instructions using Spectre attacks. To mitigate theses attacks, popular compilers deployed a wide range of countermeasures. The security of these countermeasures, however, has not been ascertained: while some of them are believed to be secure, others are known to be insecure and result in vulnerable programs. To reason about the security guarantees of these compiler-inserted countermeasures, this paper presents a framework comprising several secure compilation criteria characterizing when compilers produce code resistant against Spectre attacks. With this framework, we perform a comprehensive security analysis of compiler-level countermeasures against Spectre attacks implemented in major compilers. This work provides sound foundations to formally reason about the security of compiler-level countermeasures against Spectre attacks as well as the first proofs of security and insecurity of said countermeasures.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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