无政府主义交通与社会主义交通的异质交通网络建模与分析
Modeling and Analysis of Heterogeneous Traffic Networks with Anarchists and Socialist Traffic
摘要:
在本文中,我们考虑一个异构的交通网络与多个用户类有很大的不同,在他们的路径选择目标。特别是,我们考虑两类用户:谁寻求最大限度地减少社会成本(社会主义者)和典型的贪婪的目标(无政府主义者),这导致了一个异构的游戏称为HetGame。本文提出了一个分析框架,以获得最佳/均衡流在这样一个异构的游戏,以及相同的方法。本文考虑了不同网络的多个例子,以获得最优的交通分配。我们引入两个度量:$α$无政府状态的代价和良好行为的代价来评估无政府主义者的影响和中央指令的含义。最后,所提出的算法实现了一个真实的交通网络,以获得见解。
英文摘要:
In this paper, we consider a heterogeneous traffic network with multiple users classes which differ considerably in their path selection objective. In particular, we consider two classes of users: ones who seek to minimize social cost (socialists) and the ones with typical greedy objective (anarchists) which leads to a heterogeneous game termed as HetGame. The paper proposes an analytical framework to derive optimal/equilibrium flow in such a heterogeneous game along with a method for the same. The paper considers multiple examples of different networks to derive the optimal traffic assignment. We introduce two metrics: price of $α$ anarchy and price of good behavior to evaluate the impact of anarchists and implications of central directives. Finally, the proposed algorithm is implemented for a real traffic network to derive insights.
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