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arXiv 1909.07771econ.THcs.AI
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阿罗、豪斯多夫和复杂系统中偏好态选择的模糊性

Arrow, Hausdorff, and Ambiguities in the Choice of Preferred States in Complex Systems

Illinois Institute of Technology(伊利诺伊理工学院);University of Chicago(芝加哥大学)

T. Erber, M. J. Frank

摘要:

阿罗的“不可能性”定理认为,在许多复杂情况下,没有令人满意的方法将个人偏好汇总为集体偏好。这一结果在经济、政治等方面产生了影响,投票理论和锦标赛的结构通过用数学集合来确定选择的对象,并用豪斯多夫度量集合之间的距离来确定偏好,可以将阿罗的论点从社会学扩展到数学环境。一个结果是可逆性的概念可以用集合模式的相对配置来表达。

英文摘要:

Arrow's `impossibility' theorem asserts that there are no satisfactory methods of aggregating individual preferences into collective preferences in many complex situations. This result has ramifications in economics, politics, i.e., the theory of voting, and the structure of tournaments. By identifying the objects of choice with mathematical sets, and preferences with Hausdorff measures of the distances between sets, it is possible to extend Arrow's arguments from a sociological to a mathematical setting. One consequence is that notions of reversibility can be expressed in terms of the relative configurations of patterns of sets.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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