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arXiv 1909.07455cs.NI
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DDoS Hide & Seek:关于Booter服务删除的有效性

DDoS Hide & Seek: On the Effectiveness of a Booter Services Takedown

Daniel Kopp, Matthias Wichtlhuber, Ingmar Poese, Jair Santanna, Oliver Hohlfeld, Christoph Dietzel

摘要:

Booter服务继续提供流行的DDoS即服务平台,并使任何人,无论其技术能力如何,都可以执行具有破坏性影响的DDoS攻击。由于非法入侵者是对互联网运营的严重威胁,并可能造成重大的财务和声誉损失,因此也引起了执法机构和相关反活动的注意。在本文中,我们从一个主要的IXP和两个ISP的角度调查了野外基于引导程序的DDoS攻击以及2018年12月FBI针对15个引导程序网站的影响。我们通过对我们自己的基础设施发起Gbps级别的攻击来研究和比较多个引导程序服务的攻击属性。为了了解来自引导程序的DDoS流量的空间和时间趋势,我们仔细检查了5个月的域间流量。我们观察到,删除只会导致攻击流量暂时减少。此外,一个引导程序被发现通过为其网站使用新域名来快速继续运行。

英文摘要:

Booter services continue to provide popular DDoS-as-a-service platforms and enable anyone irrespective of their technical ability, to execute DDoS attacks with devastating impact. Since booters are a serious threat to Internet operations and can cause significant financial and reputational damage, they also draw the attention of law enforcement agencies and related counter activities. In this paper, we investigate booter-based DDoS attacks in the wild and the impact of an FBI takedown targeting 15 booter websites in December 2018 from the perspective of a major IXP and two ISPs. We study and compare attack properties of multiple booter services by launching Gbps-level attacks against our own infrastructure. To understand spatial and temporal trends of the DDoS traffic originating from booters we scrutinize 5 months, worth of inter-domain traffic. We observe that the takedown only leads to a temporary reduction in attack traffic. Additionally, one booter was found to quickly continue operation by using a new domain for its website.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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