不诚实顾问下的个人理财决策：基于Agent的模型
Personal Finance Decisions with Untruthful Advisors: an Agent-Based Model
摘要：
投资者通常求助于财务顾问来改善他们的投资过程，直到投资决策完全授权。当然，财务建议可能是投资决策中的一个修正因素，但在过去，媒体和监管机构指责有偏见的顾问操纵了天真投资者的预期。为了给问题的分析公式，我们提出了一个基于代理的模型形成的个人投资者和财务顾问。我们通过考虑财务顾问的妥协（在银行的足够奖励和保持他/她的声誉之间）和客户的妥协（在期望的回报和顾问的建议回报之间）来参数化游戏。然后，我们得到的纳什均衡和最佳反应函数的结果游戏。我们还描述了参数区域中，这些点的结果可接受的均衡和贪婪/天真的客户自然出现的模型。最后，我们关注的是最佳纳什均衡的效率。
英文摘要：
Investors usually resort to financial advisors to improve their investment process until the point of complete delegation on investment decisions. Surely, financial advice is potentially a correcting factor in investment decisions but, in the past, the media and regulators blamed biased advisors for manipulating the expectations of naive investors. In order to give an analytic formulation of the problem, we present an Agent-Based Model formed by individual investors and a financial advisor. We parametrize the games by considering a compromise for the financial advisor (between a sufficient reward by bank and to keep his/her reputation), and a compromise for the customers (between the desired return and the proposed return by advisor). Then we obtain the Nash equilibria and the best response functions of the resulting game. We also describe the parameter regions in which these points result acceptable equilibria and the greediness/naivety of the customers emerge naturally from the model. Finally, we focus on the efficiency of the best Nash equilibrium.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
