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arXiv 1909.05771cs.CR
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Taking a Look into Execute-Only Memory

Marc Schink, Johannes Obermaier

摘要:

微控制器固件的开发过程往往涉及多方。在这种情况下,知识产权(IP)不受对抗开发人员的保护,他们可以不受限制地访问固件二进制文件。因此,微控制器制造商集成了仅执行存储器(XOM),可防止在开发期间未经授权读取第三方固件。这个概念允许执行代码,但不允许任何读访问它。我们的安全分析表明,这个概念是不够的固件保护,由于使用的共享资源,如CPU和SRAM。我们提出了一种方法来推断从观察到的状态转换共享硬件的指令。我们证明了我们的方法,通过自动恢复受保护的固件。我们成功地在不同制造商的设备上进行了实验,以证实我们的攻击的实用性。我们的研究还揭示了一些分析设备中的实施缺陷,这些缺陷使对手能够绕过读出限制。总之,本文显示了XOM概念以及几种实现的安全性不足。

英文摘要:

The development process of microcontroller firmware often involves multiple parties. In such a scenario, the Intellectual Property (IP) is not protected against adversarial developers which have unrestricted access to the firmware binary. For this reason, microcontroller manufacturers integrate eXecute-Only Memory (XOM) which shall prevent an unauthorized read-out of third-party firmware during development. The concept allows execution of code but disallows any read access to it. Our security analysis shows that this concept is insufficient for firmware protection due to the use of shared resources such as the CPU and SRAM. We present a method to infer instructions from observed state transitions in shared hardware. We demonstrate our method via an automatic recovery of protected firmware. We successfully performed experiments on devices from different manufacturers to confirm the practicability of our attack. Our research also reveals implementation flaws in some of the analyzed devices which enables an adversary to bypass the read-out restrictions. Altogether, the paper shows the insufficient security of the XOM concept as well as several implementations.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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