用PACed金丝雀保护堆栈
Protecting the stack with PACed canaries
摘要:
堆栈金丝雀仍然是一种广泛部署的防御内存损坏攻击的方法。尽管金丝雀有实际用途,但它们很容易受到记忆泄露和暴力攻击。我们提出了PCan,一种基于ARMv8.3-A指针认证(PA)的新方法,它使用动态生成的金丝雀来减轻这些弱点,并表明它提供了更细粒度的保护,性能开销最小。
英文摘要:
Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and brute-forcing attacks. We propose PCan, a new approach based on ARMv8.3-A pointer authentication (PA), that uses dynamically-generated canaries to mitigate these weaknesses and show that it provides more fine-grained protection with minimal performance overhead.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。