arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1909.05747cs.CR
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用PACed金丝雀保护堆栈

Protecting the stack with PACed canaries

Hans Liljestrand, Zaheer Gauhar, Thomas Nyman, Jan-Erik Ekberg, N. Asokan

摘要:

堆栈金丝雀仍然是一种广泛部署的防御内存损坏攻击的方法。尽管金丝雀有实际用途,但它们很容易受到记忆泄露和暴力攻击。我们提出了PCan,一种基于ARMv8.3-A指针认证(PA)的新方法,它使用动态生成的金丝雀来减轻这些弱点,并表明它提供了更细粒度的保护,性能开销最小。

英文摘要:

Stack canaries remain a widely deployed defense against memory corruption attacks. Despite their practical usefulness, canaries are vulnerable to memory disclosure and brute-forcing attacks. We propose PCan, a new approach based on ARMv8.3-A pointer authentication (PA), that uses dynamically-generated canaries to mitigate these weaknesses and show that it provides more fine-grained protection with minimal performance overhead.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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