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arXiv 1909.02863cs.GT
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年龄与吞吐量共存优化网络:一个频谱共享博弈

Coexistence of Age and Throughput Optimizing Networks: A Spectrum Sharing Game

Sneihil Gopal, Sanjit K. Kaul, Rakesh Chaturvedi, Sumit Roy

摘要:

我们调查的年龄优化网络(AON)和吞吐量优化网络(TON),共享一个共同的频谱带的共存。我们考虑两种模式的长期共存:(a)网络相互竞争的频谱接入,导致他们的干扰和(b)网络合作,以实现非干扰接入。为了模拟竞争,我们定义了一个非合作阶段的游戏参数的AON的平均年龄在开始的阶段,推导出其混合策略纳什均衡(MSNE),并分析了年龄和吞吐量的演变在一个无限重复的游戏中,每个网络发挥MSNE在每个阶段。协作使用协调设备,在每个阶段执行掷硬币以选择必须访问介质的网络。网络使用严酷的触发惩罚策略,如果另一个不服从设备,则永远恢复到播放MSNE的每一个阶段。我们确定是否存在子博弈完美均衡,即,网络永远服从设备,因为它们发现合作是有益的。我们表明,网络选择合作,只有当它们由一个足够小的节点数量,否则,他们宁愿不服从设备和竞争。

英文摘要:

We investigate the coexistence of an age optimizing network (AON) and a throughput optimizing network (TON) that share a common spectrum band. We consider two modes of long run coexistence: (a) networks compete with each other for spectrum access, causing them to interfere and (b) networks cooperate to achieve non-interfering access. To model competition, we define a non-cooperative stage game parameterized by the average age of the AON at the beginning of the stage, derive its mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE), and analyze the evolution of age and throughput over an infinitely repeated game in which each network plays the MSNE at every stage. Cooperation uses a coordination device that performs a coin toss during each stage to select the network that must access the medium. Networks use the grim trigger punishment strategy, reverting to playing the MSNE every stage forever if the other disobeys the device. We determine if there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e., the networks obey the device forever as they find cooperation beneficial. We show that networks choose to cooperate only when they consist of a sufficiently small number of nodes, otherwise they prefer to disobey the device and compete.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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