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arXiv 1908.11315cs.CR
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GenoGuard真正“守护”了多少?基因组数据长期安全性的实证分析

How Much Does GenoGuard Really "Guard"? An Empirical Analysis of Long-Term Security for Genomic Data

Bristena Oprisanu, Christophe Dessimoz, Emiliano De Cristofaro

摘要:

由于其遗传性,基因组数据不仅与其所有者有关,而且与近亲有关。因此,它的敏感性不会随着时间的推移而真正降低;事实上,基因组序列的相关性可能比加密提供的安全性更长。这促使需要为基因组数据提供长期安全性的专门技术,然而用于此目的的唯一可用工具是GenoGuard(Huang等人,2015年)。通过依赖蜂蜜加密,GenoGuard可以安全地对抗可以暴力破解所有可能的密钥的对手;即,每当攻击者试图使用不正确的密码解密时,她将获得不正确但看起来似乎可信的诱饵序列。在本文中,我们将分析GenoGuard提供的真实世界的安全保证;具体而言,评估与未使用GenoGuard的加密密文相比,使用GenoGuard加密的密文获得的信息量有多少。总的来说,我们发现,如果对手可以从目标序列中获得部分信息形式的辅助信息,那么使用GenoGuard确实会明显增加她确定序列其余部分的能力。我们表明,在使用容易猜测(低熵)密码加密的序列的情况下,对手能够排除大多数诱饵序列,并获得目标序列,只有2.5%的它可作为边信息。在一个较难猜测(高熵)密码的情况下,我们表明,对手仍然获得,平均而言,更好的准确性猜测其余的目标序列比使用国家的最先进的基因组序列推断方法,获得高达15%的精度提高。

英文摘要:

Due to its hereditary nature, genomic data is not only linked to its owner but to that of close relatives as well. As a result, its sensitivity does not really degrade over time; in fact, the relevance of a genomic sequence is likely to be longer than the security provided by encryption. This prompts the need for specialized techniques providing long-term security for genomic data, yet the only available tool for this purpose is GenoGuard (Huang et al., 2015). By relying on Honey Encryption, GenoGuard is secure against an adversary that can brute force all possible keys; i.e., whenever an attacker tries to decrypt using an incorrect password, she will obtain an incorrect but plausible looking decoy sequence. In this paper, we set to analyze the real-world security guarantees provided by GenoGuard; specifically, assess how much more information does access to a ciphertext encrypted using GenoGuard yield, compared to one that was not. Overall, we find that, if the adversary has access to side information in the form of partial information from the target sequence, the use of GenoGuard does appreciably increase her power in determining the rest of the sequence. We show that, in the case of a sequence encrypted using an easily guessable (low-entropy) password, the adversary is able to rule out most decoy sequences, and obtain the target sequence with just 2.5\% of it available as side information. In the case of a harder-to-guess (high-entropy) password, we show that the adversary still obtains, on average, better accuracy in guessing the rest of the target sequences than using state-of-the-art genomic sequence inference methods, obtaining up to 15% improvement in accuracy.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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