选举干预中的非合作动态
Noncooperative dynamics in election interference
摘要：
外国势力干涉国内选举是对社会的生存威胁。这种干涉通过从战争到言论的无数方法表现出来，是经济和政治代理人之间战略互动的及时例子。我们将理性博弈者之间的这种互动建模为连续时间微分博弈，构建了一个具有各种支付结构的竞争分析模型。只有一个参与者对游戏结果的全有或全无的态度导致了军备竞赛，两国都在干涉和反干涉行动上花费越来越多的资金。然后，我们将我们的模型与有关俄罗斯干涉2016年美国总统大选的数据进行对比。我们介绍和估计的贝叶斯结构时间序列模型的选举民意调查和社交媒体帖子的俄罗斯Twitter巨魔帐户。我们的分析模型，虽然有目的地抽象和简单，充分捕捉到选举和社交媒体活动的许多时间特征。最后，我们讨论了我们的模型的缺点和建议，为今后的研究。
英文摘要：
Foreign power interference in domestic elections is an existential threat to societies. Manifested through myriad methods from war to words, such interference is a timely example of strategic interaction between economic and political agents. We model this interaction between rational game players as a continuous-time differential game, constructing an analytical model of this competition with a variety of payoff structures. All-or-nothing attitudes by only one player regarding the outcome of the game lead to an arms race in which both countries spend increasing amounts on interference and counter-interference operations. We then confront our model with data pertaining to the Russian interference in the 2016 United States presidential election contest. We introduce and estimate a Bayesian structural time series model of election polls and social media posts by Russian Twitter troll accounts. Our analytical model, while purposefully abstract and simple, adequately captures many temporal characteristics of the election and social media activity. We close with a discussion of our model's shortcomings and suggestions for future research.
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