信息结构之间基于价值的距离
Value-based distance between the information structures
摘要:
我们将两个信息结构之间的距离定义为所有零和对策中最大可能的价值差异。我们提供了一个易于处理的表征的距离,作为2个多面体之间的最小距离。我们用它来显示各种结果之间的关系,游戏和单代理问题,附加信息的价值,信息替代品,补充等,我们表明,近似知识是类似于近似常识的价值为基础的距离。然而,与弱拓扑相反,基于值的距离不具有紧凑的完备性:存在信息结构的序列,其中参与者获取越来越多的信息,并且$ε$ > 0使得序列的任何两个元素的距离至少为$ε$。这个结果否定了J.F. Mertens在他的论文"Repeated Games”,ICM 1986。
英文摘要:
We dene the distance between two information structures as the largest possible dierence in the value across all zero-sum games. We provide a tractable characterization of the distance, as the minimal distance between 2 polytopes. We use it to show various results about the relation between games and single-agent problems, the value of additional information, informational substitutes, complements, etc. We show that approximate knowledge is similar to approximate common knowledge with respect to the value-based distance. Nevertheless, contrary to the weak topology, the value-based distance does not have a compact completion: there exists a sequence of information structures, where players acquire more and more information, and $ε$ > 0 such that any two elements of the sequence have distance at least $ε$. This result answers by the negative the second (and last unsolved) of the three problems posed by J.F. Mertens in his paper Repeated Games", ICM 1986.
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