Maya:通过动态控制伪造电源侧通道
Maya: Falsifying Power Sidechannels with Dynamic Control
摘要:
由于信息通过物理输出(如功率、温度或电磁(EM)辐射)泄漏,计算机的安全性处于危险之中。攻击者可以使用先进的信号测量和分析来从这些侧通道恢复敏感数据。为了解决这个问题,本文提出了Maya,这是一种针对电源侧通道的简单有效的解决方案。这个想法是使用控制理论技术以应用程序透明的方式重新塑造应用程序消耗的功率-防止攻击者学习任何信息。利用控制理论,即使运行条件发生不可预测的变化,控制器也可以可靠地将功率保持在期望的目标值附近。然后,通过智能地改变这些目标,可以使功率以任何期望的形式出现,看起来携带实际上与应用无关的活动信息。Maya可以在特权软件或简单硬件中实现。在本文中,我们实现了两个多处理器机器上使用操作系统(OS)线程的Maya,并显示其有效性和易于部署。
英文摘要:
The security of computers is at risk because of information leaking through physical outputs such as power, temperature, or electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Attackers can use advanced signal measurement and analysis to recover sensitive data from these sidechannels. To address this problem, this paper presents Maya, a simple and effective solution against power side-channels. The idea is to re-shape the power dissipated by an application in an application-transparent manner using control theory techniques - preventing attackers from learning any information. With control theory, a controller can reliably keep power close to a desired target value even when runtime conditions change unpredictably. Then, by changing these targets intelligently, power can be made to appear in any desired form, appearing to carry activity information which, in reality, is unrelated to the application. Maya can be implemented in privileged software or in simple hardware. In this paper, we implement Maya on two multiprocessor machines using Operating System (OS) threads, and show its effectiveness and ease of deployment.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。