证据的不确定性
Uncertainty About Evidence
摘要:
我们开发了一个逻辑框架,推理的知识和证据,代理人可能不确定如何解释他们的证据。我们的模型不是将证据状态表示为状态空间的固定子集,而是允许一个证据对应的可能世界的集合从一个可能世界到另一个可能世界而变化,因此本身就是不确定性的主题。这样的结构可以被看作是拓扑空间的(认知动机)推广。在这种情况下,在证据所实际包含的内容和代理人所知道的证据所包含的内容之间产生了一种自然的区别-后者一般来说要弱得多。我们提供了一个健全的和完整的公理化相应的知识和证据蕴涵的双模态逻辑,并调查这个核心系统的一些自然扩展,包括增加了一个信念模态和证据解释和蕴涵的相互作用,并通过(广义)内部运营商解释的“可知性”模态。
英文摘要:
We develop a logical framework for reasoning about knowledge and evidence in which the agent may be uncertain about how to interpret their evidence. Rather than representing an evidential state as a fixed subset of the state space, our models allow the set of possible worlds that a piece of evidence corresponds to to vary from one possible world to another, and therefore itself be the subject of uncertainty. Such structures can be viewed as (epistemically motivated) generalizations of topological spaces. In this context, there arises a natural distinction between what is actually entailed by the evidence and what the agent knows is entailed by the evidence -- with the latter, in general, being much weaker. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the corresponding bi-modal logic of knowledge and evidence entailment, and investigate some natural extensions of this core system, including the addition of a belief modality and its interaction with evidence interpretation and entailment, and the addition of a "knowability" modality interpreted via a (generalized) interior operator.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。