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arXiv 1907.08053physics.soc-ph
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不要跟随领导者:排名绩效如何减少精英统治

Don't follow the leader: How ranking performance reduces meritocracy

Giacomo Livan

摘要:

在精英管理的名义下,现代经济投入越来越多的资源来量化和排名个人和组织的表现。排名发出了强有力的信号,导致将最佳执行者的行动确定为其他人也应采用的“最佳做法”。然而,一些研究表明,模仿最佳实践往往会导致性能下降。那么,那些在排名中落后的企业是应该模仿顶级企业,还是应该采取自己的策略呢?我通过数值模拟一个社会的程式化模型来解决这个问题,这个社会的代理人试图通过模仿顶级表演者的行为或随机尝试不同的行为来攀登排名,即,通过偶然发现该模型产生了丰富的现象学,表明模仿表现最好的人会增加整体福利,但代价是更高的不平等。事实上,模仿最优秀的人是一种弄巧成拙的策略,它巩固了少数幸运者--不一定是天才--的早期优势,导致了一个非常不平等、同质化和实际上非精英社会。相反,意外之喜有利于精英管理的结果,并防止排名冻结。

英文摘要:

In the name of meritocracy, modern economies devote increasing amounts of resources to quantifying and ranking the performance of individuals and organisations. Rankings send out powerful signals, which lead to identify the actions of top performers as the `best practices' that others should also adopt. However, several studies have shown that the imitation of best practices often leads to a drop in performance. So, should those lagging behind in a ranking imitate top performers or should they instead pursue a strategy of their own? I tackle this question by numerically simulating a stylised model of a society whose agents seek to climb a ranking either by imitating the actions of top performers or by randomly trying out different actions, i.e., via serendipity. The model gives rise to a rich phenomenology, showing that the imitation of top performers increases welfare overall, but at the cost of higher inequality. Indeed, the imitation of top performers turns out to be a self-defeating strategy that consolidates the early advantage of a few lucky - and not necessarily talented - winners, leading to a very unequal, homogenised, and effectively non-meritocratic society. Conversely, serendipity favours meritocratic outcomes and prevents rankings from freezing.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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