基于拉格朗日对偶和凸化的资源分配博弈定价
Pricing in Resource Allocation Games Based on Lagrangean Duality and Convexification
摘要:
我们考虑一个基本的资源分配游戏,其中玩家的策略空间是$R^m$的子集,成本/效用函数由一些公共向量$u\in R^m$参数化,否则,只取决于自己的策略选择。玩家的策略可以被解释为资源消耗的向量,联合策略简档自然会导致总消耗向量。资源可以被定价,也就是说,游戏通过价格向量$λ\in R^m_+$增加,并且玩家具有准线性的总成本/效用,这意味着除了原始成本/效用之外,玩家需要为每个消耗单位支付相应的价格。我们调查以下问题:对于哪些聚合消费向量$u$,我们可以找到价格$λ$,诱导实现目标消费配置文件的均衡?为了回答这个问题,我们重新审视了一个著名的基于对偶的框架,并得出了几个特征的存在,这样的$u$和$λ$使用凸化技术。我们表明,有限的战略空间或某些凹游戏,平衡存在性问题减少到解决一个结构良好的LP。然后,我们考虑一类单调聚合游戏的属性,玩家的成本/效用函数可能取决于诱导负载的战略配置文件。对于这个类,我们证明了一个充分条件的基础上以前的特征。我们证明,这个框架可以帮助统一的四个在很大程度上独立的流在文献中的部分:在运输系统中的收费,瓦尔拉斯市场均衡,交易网络和通信网络中的拥塞控制。
英文摘要:
We consider a basic resource allocation game, where the players' strategy spaces are subsets of $R^m$ and cost/utility functions are parameterized by some common vector $u\in R^m$ and, otherwise, only depend on the own strategy choice. A strategy of a player can be interpreted as a vector of resource consumption and a joint strategy profile naturally leads to an aggregate consumption vector. Resources can be priced, that is, the game is augmented by a price vector $λ\in R^m_+$ and players have quasi-linear overall costs/utilities meaning that in addition to the original costs/utilities, a player needs to pay the corresponding price per consumed unit. We investigate the following question: for which aggregated consumption vectors $u$ can we find prices $λ$ that induce an equilibrium realizing the targeted consumption profile? For answering this question, we revisit a well-known duality-based framework and derive several characterizations of the existence of such $u$ and $λ$ using convexification techniques. We show that for finite strategy spaces or certain concave games, the equilibrium existence problem reduces to solving a well-structured LP. We then consider a class of monotone aggregative games having the property that the cost/utility functions of players may depend on the induced load of a strategy profile. For this class, we show a sufficient condition of enforceability based on the previous characterizations. We demonstrate that this framework can help to unify parts of four largely independent streams in the literature: tolls in transportation systems, Walrasian market equilibria, trading networks and congestion control in communication networks.
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