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arXiv 1907.00430cs.AI
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AI价值对齐伦理效用函数的必要变化

Requisite Variety in Ethical Utility Functions for AI Value Alignment

Utrecht University(乌得勒支大学);TNO Netherlands(荷兰应用科学研究组织)

Nadisha-Marie Aliman, Leon Kester

摘要:

价值对齐是人工智能安全研究中一个重要的复杂课题,近年来人们从不同的角度进行了研究。然而,尚未就促进AI价值对齐的道德效用函数的设计达成最终共识。鉴于确定系统解决方案的紧迫性,我们假设从一个简单的事实开始可能是有用的,即人工智能的效用函数不违反人类的道德直觉,它必须是这些直觉的模型,并反映它们的多样性$ - $,其中最准确的模型与人类实体有关,人类实体是配备有大脑的生物有机体,构建道德判断等概念,是科学模型。因此,为了更好地评估人类道德的多样性,我们进行了一个跨学科的分析,应用安全思维的问题,并总结了各种相关的背景知识从神经科学和心理学。我们补充这一信息,将其链接到扩大功利主义作为一个合适的道德框架。在此基础上,我们提出了第一个实用的指导方针,设计近似的道德目标函数,可以更好地捕捉各种人类的道德判断。最后,我们总结并应对未来可能的挑战。

英文摘要:

Being a complex subject of major importance in AI Safety research, value alignment has been studied from various perspectives in the last years. However, no final consensus on the design of ethical utility functions facilitating AI value alignment has been achieved yet. Given the urgency to identify systematic solutions, we postulate that it might be useful to start with the simple fact that for the utility function of an AI not to violate human ethical intuitions, it trivially has to be a model of these intuitions and reflect their variety $ - $ whereby the most accurate models pertaining to human entities being biological organisms equipped with a brain constructing concepts like moral judgements, are scientific models. Thus, in order to better assess the variety of human morality, we perform a transdisciplinary analysis applying a security mindset to the issue and summarizing variety-relevant background knowledge from neuroscience and psychology. We complement this information by linking it to augmented utilitarianism as a suitable ethical framework. Based on that, we propose first practical guidelines for the design of approximate ethical goal functions that might better capture the variety of human moral judgements. Finally, we conclude and address future possible challenges.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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