塑造责任精英
Modeling Responsible Elite
摘要:
在ViSE(随机环境中的投票)模型中,我们研究了精英社会中由集体决策决定的社会动态。该模型允许分析参与者的社会态度的影响,如自私,集体主义,游说,利他主义等的影响,社会及其阶层的福利。社会动态取决于资本随时间的变化,以及群体的形成和分离。我们表明,存在一个负责任的精英,部分关心自己的利益,稳定社会,消除“坑损害”的悖论。社会从拥有一个负责任的精英中获得的收益与从一个同样规模的利他主义群体中获得的收益相当。如果负责任的精英屈服于诱惑,在其联合投票策略中大幅增加群体成分的权重,那么他们的收入就会大幅增加,而社会的收入则会减少。其余的参与者从加入精英中获益,而对于精英来说,保持适度的规模是有益的。如果作为对精英责任不足的回应,出现了一个数量超过精英并成为新的负责任精英的利他主义群体,那么社会再次稳定,先前精英(“精英”)的垄断结束。如果与小集团竞争的负责任的精英成为第二个小集团,那么小集团之间的激烈竞争对社会来说仍然比拥有一个独特的小集团更可取。
英文摘要:
Within the ViSE (Voting in Stochastic Environment) model, we study social dynamics determined by collective decisions in a society with an elite. The model allows the analysis of the influence of participants' social attitudes, such as the effects of selfishness, collectivism, lobbying, altruism, etc., on the welfare of the society and its strata. Social dynamics is determined by the change in capital over time, as well as the formation and dissociation of groups. We show that the presence of a responsible elite, which partially cares for its own benefit, stabilizes society and removes the `pit of damage' paradox. Society's gain from having a responsible elite is comparable to that from an altruistic group of the same size. If the responsible elite succumbs to the temptation to dramatically increase the weight of the group component in its combined voting strategy, then its income rises sharply, while the income of the society decreases. The rest of the participants benefit from joining the elite, while for the elite it is beneficial to maintain a moderate size. If, in response to insufficient responsibility of the elite, an altruistic group emerges that outnumbers the elite and becomes a new responsible elite, then society again stabilizes, and monopoly of the previous elite (a `clique') ends. If the responsible elite competing with the clique becomes a second clique, then tough competition between the cliques is still preferable for society over having a unique clique.
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