新闻评论中个人信息共享的幂律公共产品博弈
Power Law Public Goods Game for Personal Information Sharing in News Commentaries
摘要：
本文提出了一个在线评论论坛用户分享的公共物品博弈模型。特别是，我们假设共享个人信息的用户会产生信息成本，但会从更广泛的社交互动中获益。白吃白喝者从相同的社交互动中受益，但不分享个人信息。对由此产生的公共物品结构进行了理论和实证分析。特别是，我们表明，建议的游戏总是具有均衡，我们给出了纯策略均衡出现的充分条件。这些对应的用户总是以相同的方式行事，要么分享或隐藏个人信息。我们提出了一个相关的数据集的实证分析，表明我们的模型参数可以拟合，所提出的模型具有更好的解释力比相应的空（线性）模型的行为。
英文摘要：
We propose a public goods game model of user sharing in an online commenting forum. In particular, we assume that users who share personal information incur an information cost but reap the benefits of a more extensive social interaction. Freeloaders benefit from the same social interaction but do not share personal information. The resulting public goods structure is analyzed both theoretically and empirically. In particular, we show that the proposed game always possesses equilibria and we give sufficient conditions for pure strategy equilibria to emerge. These correspond to users who always behave the same way, either sharing or hiding personal information. We present an empirical analysis of a relevant data set, showing that our model parameters can be fit and that the proposed model has better explanatory power than a corresponding null (linear) model of behavior.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
