随机攻击和概率传播下的网络形成
Network Formation under Random Attack and Probabilistic Spread
摘要:
我们研究了一个网络形成的游戏,代理商通过与其他代理商形成连接来获得利益,但也会从形成的连接中产生直接和间接成本。具体来说,一旦代理购买了它们的连接,攻击就从网络中随机选择的顶点开始,并根据独立级联模型以固定的概率传播,摧毁任何受感染的代理。在我们的游戏中,代理的效用或福利被定义为代理在攻击后的连接组件的预期大小减去她在形成连接时的支出。我们的目标是了解在这个博弈中形成的均衡网络的性质。我们的第一个结果涉及平衡网络的边密度。网络连接既增加了攻击后与其他代理保持连接的可能性,也增加了感染级联传播的可能性。我们发现,后者的关注主要占上风,在我们的游戏中的任何均衡网络只包含$O(n\log n)$边缘,其中$n$表示代理的数量。另一方面,存在包含$Ω(n)$边的平衡网络,这表明我们的边密度边界紧到对数因子。我们的第二个结果表明,只要网络不是太密集,攻击的存在及其通过级联的传播不会显著降低社会福利。我们证明了任何具有$O(n)$边的非平凡均衡网络都具有$Θ(n^2)$社会福利,渐近类似于没有任何攻击的博弈中的社会福利保证。
英文摘要:
We study a network formation game where agents receive benefits by forming connections to other agents but also incur both direct and indirect costs from the formed connections. Specifically, once the agents have purchased their connections, an attack starts at a randomly chosen vertex in the network and spreads according to the independent cascade model with a fixed probability, destroying any infected agents. The utility or welfare of an agent in our game is defined to be the expected size of the agent's connected component post-attack minus her expenditure in forming connections. Our goal is to understand the properties of the equilibrium networks formed in this game. Our first result concerns the edge density of equilibrium networks. A network connection increases both the likelihood of remaining connected to other agents after an attack as well the likelihood of getting infected by a cascading spread of infection. We show that the latter concern primarily prevails and any equilibrium network in our game contains only $O(n\log n)$ edges where $n$ denotes the number of agents. On the other hand, there are equilibrium networks that contain $Ω(n)$ edges showing that our edge density bound is tight up to a logarithmic factor. Our second result shows that the presence of attack and its spread through a cascade does not significantly lower social welfare as long as the network is not too dense. We show that any non-trivial equilibrium network with $O(n)$ edges has $Θ(n^2)$ social welfare, asymptotically similar to the social welfare guarantee in the game without any attacks.
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