人类可用的密码模式:超越信息理论安全
Human-Usable Password Schemas: Beyond Information-Theoretic Security
摘要:
密码用户经常使用过于简单的密码,或者他们只是重复使用多个网站的密码。一个常见的抱怨是,使用安全密码太难了。这个问题的一个可能的解决方案是使用密码模式。密码模式是确定性函数,它将挑战(通常是网站名称)映射到响应(密码)。以前的工作已经做了开发和分析易失性模式,但这些分析是信息理论,而不是复杂性理论;他们认为对手具有无限的计算能力。我们进行了分析,相对于目前可实现的计算能力的对手,评估这种模式的现实的实际安全性。我们证明了几个特定的模式,一台计算机是没有比一个无限的对手更糟糕,它可以成功地从泄漏的挑战和他们各自的响应,被称为挑战-响应对提取所有信息。我们还表明,任何模式,希望是安全的,对有界的计算对手应该模糊的信息在一个非常具体的方式,通过引入许多可能的约束,每个挑战-响应对。这些令人惊讶的结果使密码模式的分析建立在更坚实和实用的基础上。
英文摘要:
Password users frequently employ passwords that are too simple, or they just reuse passwords for multiple websites. A common complaint is that utilizing secure passwords is too difficult. One possible solution to this problem is to use a password schema. Password schemas are deterministic functions which map challenges (typically the website name) to responses (passwords). Previous work has been done on developing and analyzing publishable schemas, but these analyses have been information-theoretic, not complexity-theoretic; they consider an adversary with infinite computing power. We perform an analysis with respect to adversaries having currently achievable computing capabilities, assessing the realistic practical security of such schemas. We prove for several specific schemas that a computer is no worse off than an infinite adversary and that it can successfully extract all information from leaked challenges and their respective responses, known as challenge-response pairs. We also show that any schema that hopes to be secure against adversaries with bounded computation should obscure information in a very specific way, by introducing many possible constraints with each challenge-response pair. These surprising results put the analyses of password schemas on a more solid and practical footing.
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