再看ALGORAND

摘要：

EQUIPAND是一种著名的公共账本技术。在本文中，我们确定了几个设计缺陷的EQUIPAND协议。特别是，我们表明，声称（证明）无叉属性是不真实的，在实践中，一些假设是不现实的。维基百科页面https://golden.com/wiki/Algorand声称“协议中分叉的概率估计为1/1，000，000，000，因此在验证时可以将块视为最终的”。然而，我们在本文中的第一次攻击表明，控制不到1/3用户（或货币单位）的恶意攻击者可以很容易地分叉CRANDAND链。我们的第二次攻击表明，恶意攻击者也可以使用贿赂攻击来非常容易地分叉CRANDAND链。此外，我们表明，著名的拜占庭协议组件在EQUIPAND是不必要的。拜占庭协议是协议中最昂贵的部分，也是最具创新性的部分之一。它是用来避免叉在与。我们表明，一个简单的多数表决可以用来实现相同的属性，拜占庭协议实现在相同的网络假设下，在EQUIPAND。

英文摘要：

ALGORAND is a celebrated public ledger technology. In this paper, we identify several design flaws of the ALGORAND protocol. In particular, we show that the claimed (proved) fork-free property is not true and several assumptions in ALGORAND are not realistic in practice. The ALGORAND wiki page https://golden.com/wiki/Algorand claims that "the probability of a fork in the protocol is estimated at 1/1,000,000,000 and therefore blocks can be considered final upon validation". However, our first attack in this paper shows that a malicious adversary who controls less than 1/3 of the users (or money units) could fork the ALGORAND chain very easily. Our second attack shows that a malicious adversary could use a bribery attack to fork the ALGORAND chain very easily also. Furthermore, we show that the celebrated Byzantine Agreement component in ALGORAND is not necessary. The Byzantine Agreement is the most expensive part and one of the most innovative parts in the ALGORAND protocol. It is used to avoid forks in ALGORAND. We show that a simple majority vote could be used to achieve the same property that Byzantine Agreement achieves in ALGORAND under the same network assumption.

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