测量互联网上不规则的地理暴露
Measuring Irregular Geographic Exposure on the Internet
摘要：
我们研究不必要的流量暴露的路由基础设施的国家地理上无关的数据包传输的程度。我们量化了哪些国家在地理上是合乎逻辑的，通过使用凸包外接的主要人口中心，观察两个国家之间的网络路径。然后，我们将其与在超过25亿条测量路径中观察到的民族国家进行比较。我们研究了互联网的整个地理拓扑以及Tor用户通常会与之交互的拓扑子集。我们发现，在互联网的整个地理拓扑中，44%的路径和用户体验子集中的33%的路径不必要地将流量暴露给一个或多个国家。最后，我们考虑的情况下，国家行使法律和物理控制的自治系统，获得访问其地理边界之外的流量，但进行的组织属于AS的注册国家的法律管辖。在这两种测量中，至少有49%的路径将流量暴露给地理上不相关的国家，同时考虑路径经过的物理和法律国家。
英文摘要：
We examine the extent of needless traffic exposure by the routing infrastructure to nations geographically irrelevant to packet transmission. We quantify what countries are geographically logical to observe on a network path traveling between two nations through the use of convex hulls circumscribing major population centers. We then compare that to the nation states observed in over 2.5 billion measured paths. We examine both the entire geographic topology of the Internet and a subset of the topology that a Tor user would typically interact with. We find that 44% of paths across the entire geographic topology of the Internet and 33% of paths in the user experience subset unnecessarily expose traffic to one or more nations. Finally, we consider the scenario where countries exercise both legal and physical control over autonomous systems, gaining access to traffic outside of their geographic borders, but carried by organizations that fall under the AS's registered country's legal jurisdiction. At least 49% of paths in both measurements expose traffic to a geographically irrelevant country when considering both the physical and legal countries that a path traverses.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
