横向流动的流行病学:网络传染模型的暴露与对策
The epidemiology of lateral movement: exposures and countermeasures with network contagion models
摘要:
开发了一种用于分析计算机网络以识别处于被试图经由认证在网络中横向移动的对手危害的特定风险中的系统和账户的方法。对手的动态被建模为通过来自管理员帐户访问和活动会话数据的认证关系链接的系统之间的传染病传播。假设攻击者通过凭证链接遍历网络,其中攻击者从一个系统窃取凭证,使用它们向另一个系统进行身份验证,并重复该过程。图拓扑措施被用来分析不同的传染模型应用到一个真正的Windows网络的三个主要风险,通过识别:帐户,无论是单独或集体,提供广泛和深远的访问许多系统在整个网络中;帐户显着的特权升级责任;和“看门人”系统,通过对手必须通过,以达到关键资产。该方法可用于测试不同的缓解措施和对策如何影响这些风险;例如,我们发现,禁用本地帐户的远程注册和实施保护措施,防止在远程主机上缓存凭据,可以大大减少横向移动和特权升级。
英文摘要:
An approach is developed for analyzing computer networks to identify systems and accounts that are at particular risk of compromise by an adversary seeking to move laterally through the network via authentication. The dynamics of the adversary are modeled as a contagion spreading across systems linked via authentication relationships derived from Administrator account access and active session data. The adversary is assumed to traverse the network via credential chaining, where the adversary steals credentials from one system, uses them to authenticate to another, and repeats the process. Graph topology measures are used to analyze different contagion models applied to a real Windows network for three primary exposures by identifying: accounts which, either individually or collectively, provide wide and far-reaching access to many systems across the network; accounts with notable privilege escalation liability; and "gatekeeper" systems through which the adversary must pass in order to reach critical assets. The approach can be used to test how different mitigations and countermeasures affect these exposures; for example, we find that disabling remote logins by local accounts and implementing protections that prevent the caching of credentials on remote hosts can substantially curtail lateral movement and privilege escalation.
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