线性可解平均场交通路由对策
Linearly Solvable Mean-Field Traffic Routing Games
摘要:
我们考虑一个动态的交通路由游戏在城市道路网络中,涉及大量的司机,其中每个司机选择一个特定的路线受到惩罚,是仿射的对数的司机选择相同的路线。我们表明,这样的游戏的平均场近似导致所谓的线性可解的马尔可夫决策过程,这意味着它的平均场平衡(MFE)可以找到简单地通过解决有限维线性系向后的时间。在此基础上,进一步证明了所得到的MFE具有强时间一致性的显著性质。得到的MFE和一个特定的类虚构的发挥之间的连接进行了讨论。
英文摘要:
We consider a dynamic traffic routing game over an urban road network involving a large number of drivers in which each driver selecting a particular route is subject to a penalty that is affine in the logarithm of the number of drivers selecting the same route. We show that the mean-field approximation of such a game leads to the so-called linearly solvable Markov decision process, implying that its mean-field equilibrium (MFE) can be found simply by solving a finite-dimensional linear system backward in time. Based on this backward-only characterization, it is further shown that the obtained MFE has the notable property of strong time-consistency. A connection between the obtained MFE and a particular class of fictitious play is also discussed.
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