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arXiv 1902.10535cs.GTcs.MA
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偏好下的匹配:稳定性强度与权衡

Matchings under Preferences: Strength of Stability and Trade-offs

Jiehua Chen, Piotr Skowron, Manuel Sorge

摘要:

我们提出了两个解决方案的概念匹配下的偏好:鲁棒性和近稳定性。前者加强了Gale和Shapley(1962)对稳定性的经典定义,而后者则放松了这一定义。非正式地说,鲁棒性要求匹配在经典意义上必须是稳定的,即使代理稍微改变了他们的偏好。另一方面,接近稳定性要求匹配必须变得稳定(同样是经典意义上的稳定),前提是代理人愿意稍微调整他们的偏好。我们的两个概念都是定量的;它们一起提供了对匹配稳定性进行细粒度分析的方法。此外,我们的概念允许探索稳定性和社会最优性的其他标准之间的权衡,如平均成本和不匹配的代理商的数量。我们调查的计算复杂性找到匹配,实现某些预定义的权衡。我们提供了一个多项式时间算法,给定代理的偏好返回一个社会最优的鲁棒匹配,我们证明,找到一个社会最优的和近稳定的匹配是计算困难的。

英文摘要:

We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness requires that a matching must be stable in the classic sense, even if the agents slightly change their preferences. Near stability, on the other hand, imposes that a matching must become stable (again, in the classic sense) provided the agents are willing to adjust their preferences a bit. Both of our concepts are quantitative; together they provide means for a fine-grained analysis of stability for matchings. Moreover, our concepts allow to explore the trade-offs between stability and other criteria of societal optimality, such as the egalitarian cost and the number of unmatched agents. We investigate the computational complexity of finding matchings that implement certain predefined trade-offs. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that given agents' preferences returns a socially optimal robust matching, and we prove that finding a socially optimal and nearly stable matching is computationally hard.

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