Conditional probabilities in quantum systems which have both initial and final boundary conditions are commonly evaluated using the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz rule. In this short note we present a seemingly disturbing paradox that appears when applying the rule to systems with slightly broken degeneracies. In these cases we encounter a singular limit - the probability "jumps" when going from perfect degeneracy to negligibly broken one. We trace the origin of the paradox and solve it from both traditional and modern perspectives in order to highlight the physics behind it: the necessity to take into account the finite resolution of the measuring device. As a practical example, we study the application of the rule to the Zeeman effect. The analysis presented here may stress the general need to first consider the governing physical principles before heading to the mathematical formalism, in particular when exploring puzzling quantum phenomena.
A new interpretation of quantum mechanics is proposed according to which precedence, freedom and novelty play central roles. This is based on a modification of the postulates for quantum theory given by Masanes and Muller. We argue that quantum mechanics is uniquely characterized as the probabilistic theory in which individual systems have maximal freedom in their responses to experiment, given reasonable axioms for the behavior of probabilities in a physical theory. Thus, to the extent that quantum systems are free, in the sense of Conway and Kochen, there is a sense in which they are maximal…
Probabilities may be subjective or objective; we are concerned with both kinds of probability, and the relationship between them. The fundamental theory of objective probability is quantum mechanics: it is argued that neither Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation, nor the pilot-wave theory, nor stochastic state-reduction theories, give a satisfactory answer to the question of what objective probabilities are in quantum mechanics, or why they should satisfy the Born rule; nor do they give any reason why subjective probabilities should track objective ones. But it is shown that if probability only ar…
By means of the examples of classical and Bohmian quantum mechanics, we illustrate the well-known ideas of Boltzmann as to how one gets from laws defined for the universe as a whole to dynamical relations describing the evolution of subsystems. We explain how probabilities enter into this process, what quantum and classical probabilities have in common and where exactly their difference lies.
We analyze the objective meaning of probabilities in the context of the many-worlds interpretation of Everett. For this purpose we study in details the weak law of large numbers and the role of typicality and universally negligible probabilities (through the works of Cournot and Borel). We demonstrate that Everett's theory doesn't provide any clue for fixing a probability rule and therefore contradicts irrevocably empirical facts and Born's law.
In the last five years of his life Itamar Pitowsky developed the idea that the formal structure of quantum theory should be thought of as a Bayesian probability theory adapted to the empirical situation that Nature's events just so happen to conform to a non-Boolean algebra. QBism too takes a Bayesian stance on the probabilities of quantum theory, but its probabilities are the personal degrees of belief a sufficiently-schooled agent holds for the consequences of her actions on the external world. Thus QBism has two levels of the personal where the Pitowskyan view has one. The differences go fu…
We discuss "the plane wave approximation" to quantum mechanical scattering using simple one-dimensional examples. The central points of the paper are that (a) plane waves should be thought of as infinitely wide wave packets, and (b) the calculations of reflection and transmission probabilities $R$ and $T$ in standard textbook presentations involve an approximation which is almost never discussed. We argue that it should be discussed explicitly, and that doing so provides a simple and intuitively revealing alternative way to derive and understand certain formulas. Using an under-appreciated exa…
In the paper with the above title, D. T. Gillespie [Phys. Rev. A 49, 1607, (1994)] claims that the theory of Markov stochastic processes cannot provide an adequate mathematical framework for quantum mechanics. In conjunction with the specific quantum dynamics considered there, we give a general analysis of the associated dichotomic jump processes. If we assume that Gillespie's "measurement probabilities" \it are \rm the transition probabilities of a stochastic process, then the process must have an invariant (time independent) probability measure. Alternatively, if we demand the probability me…
It is shown that the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen conclusion concerning the `incompleteness' of Quantum Mechanics is invalidated by two logical errors in their argument. If it were possible to perform the proposed gedanken experiment it would, in fact, show that Quantum Mechanics is `complete' for the observables discussed. Because, however, of the non square-integrable nature of the wave function, the proposed experiment gives vanishing probabilities for measurements performed in finite intervals of configuration or momentum space. Hence no conclusion as to the `completeness', or otherwise, of Qua…
Zurek claims to have derived Born's rule noncircularly in the context of an ontological no-collapse interpretation of quantum states, without any "deus ex machina imposition of the symptoms of classicality." After a brief review of Zurek's derivation it is argued that this claim is exaggerated if not wholly unjustified. In order to demonstrate that Born's rule arises noncircularly from deterministically evolving quantum states, it is not sufficient to assume that quantum states are somehow associated with probabilities and then prove that these probabilities are given by Born's rule. One has t…
Most scholars maintain that quantum mechanics (QM) is a contextual theory and that quantum probability does not allow an epistemic (ignorance) interpretation. By inquiring possible connections between contextuality and non-classical probabilities we show that a class T of theories can be selected in which probabilities are introduced as classical averages of Kolmogorovian probabilities over sets of (microscopic) contexts, which endows them with an epistemic interpretation. The conditions characterizing T are compatible with classical mechanics (CM), statistical mechanics (SM) and QM, hence we …
The Jordan algebra structure of the bounded real quantum observables was recognized already in the early days of quantum mechanics. While there are plausible reasons for most parts of this structure, the existence of the distributive nonassociative multiplication operation is hard to justify from a physical or statistical point of view. Considering the non-Boolean extension of classical probabilities, presented in a recent paper, it is shown in this paper that such a multiplication operation can be derived from certain properties of the conditional probabilities and the observables, i.e., from…
We show that probabilities of results of all possible measurements performing on a quantum system depend on the system's state only through its density matrix. Therefore all experimentally available information about the state contains in the density matrix. In this study, we do not postulate that measurements obey some given formalism (such as observables, positive-operator valued measures, etc.), and do not use Born rule. The process of measurement is considered in a fully operational manner---as an interaction of a measured system with some black-box apparatus. The key point of our approach…
In ordinary situations involving a small part of the universe, Born's rule seems to work well for calculating probabilities of observations in quantum theory. However, there are a number of reasons for believing that it is not adequate for many cosmological purposes. Here a number of possible generalizations of Born's rule are discussed, explaining why they are consistent with the present statistical support for Born's rule in ordinary situations but can help solve various cosmological problems.
Observables and instruments have played significant roles in recent studies on the foundations of quantum mechanics. Sequential products of effects and conditioned observables have also been introduced. After an introduction in Section~1, we review these concepts in Section~2. Moreover, it is shown how these ideas can be unified within the framework of measurement models. In Section~3, we illustrate these concepts and their relationships for the simple example of a qubit Hilbert space. Conditioned observables and their distributions are studied in Section~4. Section~5 considers joint probabili…
Are there physical, probabilistic or information-theoretic principles which characterize the quantum probabilities and distinguish them from the classical case as well as from other probability theories, or which reveal why quantum mechanics requires its very special mathematical formalism? The paper identifies the fundamental absence of third-order interference as such a principle of `quantumness'. Considering three-slit experiments, the concept of third-order interference was originally introduced by Sorkin in 1994.
In 1989, Deutsch gave a basic physical explanation of why quantum-mechanical probabilities are squares of amplitudes. Essentially, a general state vector is transformed into a highly symmetric equal-amplitude superposition. The argument was recently elaborated and publicised by DeWitt. It has remained incomplete, however, inasmuch as both authors anticipate the usual normalization (sum of amplitudes squared) of state vectors. In the present paper, a thought experiment is devised in which Deutsch's idea is demonstrated independently of the normalization, exploiting further symmetries instead.
It is possible to completely explain all aspects of quantum mechanics by expressing the relations between physical properties in terms of complex conditional probabilities (Phys. Rev. A 89, 042115(2014)). These fully deterministic probabilities replace the classical notions of phase space geometries and continuous trajectories with a more accurate description that takes into account the role of dynamics in the emergence of reality. We can then understand why so many previous attempts to find a detailed explanation of quantum phenomena have failed: the assumption of a static reality breaks down…
Epistemic interpretations of quantum mechanics fail to address the puzzle posed by the occurrence of probabilities in a fundamental physical theory. This is a puzzle about the physical world, not a puzzle about our relation to the physical world. Its solution requires a new concept of physical space, presented in this article. An examination of how the mind and the brain construct the phenomenal world reveals the psychological and neurobiological reasons why we think about space in ways that are inadequate to the physical world. The resulting notion that space is an intrinsically partitioned e…
Based on a gambling formulation of quantum mechanics, we derive a Gleason-type theorem that holds for any dimension n of a quantum system, and in particular for n = 2. The theorem states that the only logically consistent probability assignments are exactly the ones that are definable as the trace of the product of a projector and a density matrix operator. In addition, we detail the reason why dispersion-free probabilities are actually not valid, or rational, probabilities for quantum mechanics, and hence should be excluded from consideration.
We introduce a formulation of quantum theory (QT) as a general probabilistic theory but expressed via quasi-expectation operators (QEOs). This formulation provides a direct interpretation of density matrices as quasi-moment matrices. Using QEOs, we will provide a series of representation theorems, a' la de Finetti, relating a classical probability mass function (satisfying certain symmetries) to a quasi-expectation operator. We will show that QT for both distinguishable and indistinguishable particles can be formulated in this way. Although particles indistinguishability is considered a truly …
A longstanding issue in attempts to understand the Everett (Many-Worlds) approach to quantum mechanics is the origin of the Born rule: why is the probability given by the square of the amplitude? Following Vaidman, we note that observers are in a position of self-locating uncertainty during the period between the branches of the wave function splitting via decoherence and the observer registering the outcome of the measurement. In this period it is tempting to regard each branch as equiprobable, but we argue that the temptation should be resisted. Applying lessons from this analysis, we demons…
In physics, there is the prevailing intuition that we are part of a unique external world, and that the goal of physics is to understand and describe this world. This assumption of the fundamentality of objective reality is often seen as a major prerequisite of any kind of scientific reasoning. However, here I argue that we should consider relaxing this assumption in a specific way in some contexts. Namely, there is a collection of open questions in and around physics that can arguably be addressed in a substantially more consistent and rigorous way if we consider the possibility that the firs…
We present a classical algorithm that, for any $D$-dimensional geometrically-local, quantum circuit $C$ of polylogarithmic-depth, and any bit string $x \in {0,1}^n$, can compute the quantity $|<x|C|0^{\otimes n}>|^2$ to within any inverse-polynomial additive error in quasi-polynomial time, for any fixed dimension $D$. This is an extension of the result [CC21], which originally proved this result for $D = 3$. To see why this is interesting, note that, while the $D = 1$ case of this result follows from standard use of Matrix Product States, known for decades, the $D = 2$ case required novel and …
The paper explains why an ontology of permanent point particles that are individuated by their relative positions and that move on continuous trajectories as given by a deterministic law of motion constitutes the best solution to the measurement problem in both quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. This case is made by comparing the Bohmian theory to collapse theories such as the GRW matter density and the GRW flash theory. It is argued that the Bohmian theory makes the minimal changes, concerning only the dynamics and neither the ontology nor the account of probabilities, that are neces…
Quantification starts with sum and product rules that express combination and partition. These rules rest on elementary symmetries that have wide applicability, which explains why arithmetical adding up and splitting into proportions are ubiquitous. Specifically, measure theory formalises addition, and probability theory formalises inference in terms of proportions. Quantum theory rests on the same simple symmetries, but is formalised in two dimensions, not just one, in order to track an object through its binary interactions with other objects. The symmetries still require sum and product rul…
It is known that "quantum non locality", leading to the violation of Bell's inequality and more generally of classical local realism, can be attributed to the conjunction of two properties, that we call here elementary locality and predictive completeness. Taking this point of view, we show again that quantum mechanics violates predictive completeness, allowing to make contextual inferences, which can in turn explain why quantum non locality does not contradict relativistic causality. But if the usual quantum state $ψ$ is predictively incomplete, how to complete it ? We give here a set of new …
There is a compelling intellectual case for exploring whether purely unitary quantum theory defines a sensible and scientifically adequate theory, as Everett originally proposed. Many different and incompatible attempts to define a coherent Everettian quantum theory have been made over the past fifty years. However, no known version of the theory (unadorned by extra ad hoc postulates) can account for the appearance of probabilities and explain why the theory it was meant to replace, Copenhagen quantum theory, appears to be confirmed, or more generally why our evolutionary history appears to be…
