对安全设备配对和引导的错误绑定攻击
Misbinding Attacks on Secure Device Pairing and Bootstrapping
摘要：
在针对认证密钥交换协议的身份错误绑定攻击中，合法但受损的参与者操纵诚实的参与者，使得受害者在不知不觉中与第三方相关联。这些攻击是众所周知的，抵抗错误绑定被认为是互联网安全协议的关键要求。另一方面，在设备配对的背景下，这种攻击在可信计算社区之外几乎没有受到关注。本文指出，大多数设备配对协议都容易发生错误绑定。设备配对协议的特征在于缺乏关于另一端点的先验信息，诸如标识符和加密信任根。因此，配对协议中的设备需要通过用户对它们的物理访问来识别。作为演示错误绑定漏洞的案例研究，我们使用蓝牙和一种将新的物联网设备注册到无线网络上的身份验证服务器的协议。我们实施了袭击。我们还展示了如何攻击可以发现在正式模型的协议精心制定的对应断言。通过形式化分析，提出了一种新型的双重错误绑定攻击。虽然配对协议已被广泛建模和分析，错误绑定似乎是一个方面，以前没有得到足够的重视。最后，我们讨论了潜在的方法来减轻威胁和它的安全性的配对协议的意义。
英文摘要：
In identity misbinding attacks against authenticated key-exchange protocols, a legitimate but compromised participant manipulates the honest parties so that the victim becomes unknowingly associated with a third party. These attacks are well known, and resistance to misbinding is considered a critical requirement for security protocols on the Internet. In the context of device pairing, on the other hand, the attack has received little attention outside the trusted-computing community. This paper points out that most device pairing protocols are vulnerable to misbinding. Device pairing protocols are characterized by lack of a-priory information, such as identifiers and cryptographic roots of trust, about the other endpoint. Therefore, the devices in pairing protocols need to be identified by the user's physical access to them. As case studies for demonstrating the misbinding vulnerability, we use Bluetooth and a protocol that registers new IoT devices to authentication servers on wireless networks. We have implemented the attacks. We also show how the attacks can be found in formal models of the protocols with carefully formulated correspondence assertions. The formal analysis yields a new type of double misbinding attack. While pairing protocols have been extensively modelled and analyzed, misbinding seems to be an aspect that has not previously received sufficient attention. Finally, we discuss potential ways to mitigate the threat and its significance to security of pairing protocols.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
