最后通牒博弈的反应-达尔文模型：关于高扩散中适度的优势
A Reactive-Darwinian Model for the Ultimatum Game: On the Dominance of Moderation in High Diffusion
摘要：
我们考虑一个版本的最后通牒博弈，同时结合反应和达尔文的方面提供[0，1]。通过反应方面，我们考虑导致玩家改变他们的报价的影响。另一方面，达尔文的观点对应于当当前玩家与他们的邻居之一进行比较时，根据最佳游戏收益复制更好的策略。因此，我们考虑三种不同的策略，它们决定了参与者如何改变他们的报价：贪婪，温和和保守。首先，我们提供了一个分析研究的静态版本的游戏，达尔文方面没有考虑。然后，通过在二维格子上使用详细而完整的多智能体系统的数值模拟，我们添加了一个额外的功能，其中玩家出于明显的原因可能会从极端报价（接近0或1的报价）中逃脱。参与者也被赋予互惠性，他们作为提议者的收益，这反映在他们作为回应者的收益上。我们还分析了球员的移动效应的影响。分析了共存策略的出现和主导策略的变化，这反过来又取决于玩家的移动率。
英文摘要：
We consider a version of the ultimatum game which simultaneously combines reactive and Darwinian aspects with offers in [0,1]. By reactive aspects, we consider the effects that lead the player to change their offer given the previous result. On the other hand, Darwinian aspects correspond to copying a better strategy according to best game payoff when the current player compares with one of their neighbours. Therefore, we consider three different strategies, which govern how the players change their offers: greedy, moderate, and conservative. First, we provide an analytic study of a static version of game, where Darwinian aspects are not considered. Then, by using numerical simulations of a detailed and complete multi-agent system on a two dimensional lattice, we add an extra feature, in which players probabilistically scape from extreme offers (those close to 0 or 1) for obvious reasons. The players are also endowed reciprocity on their gains as proposers, which is reflected on their gains as responders. We also analyse the influence of the player's mobility effects. An analysis of the emergence of coexistence of strategies and changes on the dominant strategies are observed, which in turn depends on the player's mobility rate.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
