错误信息和虚假信息的价值
The Value of Misinformation and Disinformation
摘要：
信息是战争中的一个关键方面。错误情报或假情报等不准确情报使军事行动更加复杂。在本文中，我们研究了错误信息和虚假信息对军事领导人的价值，这些领导人通过对人员、项目和技术的投资，能够影响其他参与者之间沟通的信息的准确性。我们将问题建模为一个部分可观察的随机对策，有三个代理，一个领导者和两个追随者。我们确定两个（i）敌对追随者和（ii）盟友追随者之间传播的错误信息或虚假信息对领导者的价值。我们证明，只有在某些条件下，普遍的直觉，领导者将受益于较少（更多）准确的通信之间的敌对（盟友）的追随者是有效的。我们分析了为什么直觉可能会失败，并显示一个整体的范式，同时考虑到奖励结构和代理的政策是必要的，以正确地确定错误信息和虚假信息的价值。我们的研究确定了有效的有针对性的投资，以影响追随者之间沟通的信息的准确性，从而对领导者有利。
英文摘要：
Information is a critical dimension in warfare. Inaccurate information such as misinformation or disinformation further complicates military operations. In this paper, we examine the value of misinformation and disinformation to a military leader who through investment in people, programs and technology is able to affect the accuracy of information communicated between other actors. We model the problem as a partially observable stochastic game with three agents, a leader and two followers. We determine the value to the leader of misinformation or disinformation being communicated between two (i) adversarial followers and (ii) allied followers. We demonstrate that only under certain conditions, the prevalent intuition that the leader would benefit from less (more) accurate communication between adversarial (allied) followers is valid. We analyzed why the intuition may fail and show a holistic paradigm taking into account both the reward structures and policies of agents is necessary in order to correctly determine the value of misinformation and disinformation. Our research identifies efficient targeted investments to affect the accuracy of information communicated between followers to the leader's advantage.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
