有理门限密码体制
Rational Threshold Cryptosystems
摘要：
我们提出了一个框架下的门限密码系统的许可经济模型，其中的参与者是理性的利润最大化的实体。迄今为止，阈值密码系统已被认为是在许可的设置与有限的对手。我们的框架依赖于一个托管服务，该服务削减和重新分配存款，以激励参与者坚持所需的行为。今天，比以往任何时候都更复杂的托管服务可以在以太坊等公共区块链上实现，而无需额外的信任假设。理性阈值密码系统的关键威胁是共谋--通过“非法”合作，一部分参与者可以泄露密码系统的秘密，而这反过来又转化为不公平的利润。我们对付共谋的对策是陷害。如果第三方被告知共谋，它会奖励框架并削减所有其他参与者的存款。我们发现，串通各方发现自己在囚犯的困境中，占主导地位的战略是框架。
英文摘要：
We propose a framework for threshold cryptosystems under a permissionless-economic model in which the participants are rational profit-maximizing entities. To date, threshold cryptosystems have been considered under permissioned settings with a limited adversary. Our framework relies on an escrow service that slashes and redistributes deposits to incentivize participants to adhere desired behaviors. Today, more than ever, sophisticated escrow services can be implemented over public blockchains like Ethereum, without additional trust assumptions. The key threat to rational threshold cryptosystems is collusion---by cooperating `illegally', a subset of participants can reveal the cryptosystem's secret, which, in turn is translated to unfair profit. Our countermeasure to collusion is framing. If the escrow is notified of collusion, it rewards the framer and slashes the deposits of all other participants. We show that colluding parties find themselves in the prisoner's dilemma, where the dominant strategy is framing.
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