arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1901.00897cs.CYcs.CR
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请忘记我去年夏天在哪里:公共位置(Meta)数据的隐私风险

Please Forget Where I Was Last Summer: The Privacy Risks of Public Location (Meta)Data

Kostas Drakonakis, Panagiotis Ilia, Sotiris Ioannidis, Jason Polakis

摘要:

位置数据的暴露对用户构成了重大的隐私风险,因为它可能导致去匿名化、敏感信息的推断,甚至是物理威胁。在本文中,我们提出了LPAditor,一个工具,进行全面评估的隐私损失所造成的公开可用的位置元数据。首先,我们展示了我们的系统如何通过识别用户的实际邮政地址来以前所未有的粒度精确定位用户的关键位置。我们对Twitter数据的实验评估突出了我们的技术的有效性,这些技术在家庭和工作场所中的表现分别超过了18.9%-91.6%和8.7%-21.8%。接下来,我们提出了一个新的探索自动私人信息推断,发现“敏感”的位置,用户访问过(有关健康,宗教和性/夜生活)。我们发现,位置元数据可以提供额外的上下文推文,从而导致暴露的私人信息,可能不符合用户的意图。我们进一步探索了用户操作和信息暴露之间的不匹配,并发现旧版本的官方Twitter应用程序遵循侵犯隐私的政策,即在用户以粗粒度级别进行地理标记的推文元数据中包含精确的GPS坐标(例如,市)。这种暴露的影响进一步加剧了我们的发现,即用户在暴露精确的位置数据方面相当谨慎。当用户可以明确选择发布什么位置数据时,使用GPS坐标的推文减少了94.6%。作为当前为用户提供更多数据控制权的努力的一部分,LPAditor可以被主要服务采用,并作为审计工具提供,通知用户他们通过位置元数据(间接)暴露的敏感信息。

英文摘要:

The exposure of location data constitutes a significant privacy risk to users as it can lead to de-anonymization, the inference of sensitive information, and even physical threats. In this paper we present LPAuditor, a tool that conducts a comprehensive evaluation of the privacy loss caused by publicly available location metadata. First, we demonstrate how our system can pinpoint users' key locations at an unprecedented granularity by identifying their actual postal addresses. Our experimental evaluation on Twitter data highlights the effectiveness of our techniques which outperform prior approaches by 18.9%-91.6% for homes and 8.7%-21.8% for workplaces. Next we present a novel exploration of automated private information inference that uncovers "sensitive" locations that users have visited (pertaining to health, religion, and sex/nightlife). We find that location metadata can provide additional context to tweets and thus lead to the exposure of private information that might not match the users' intentions. We further explore the mismatch between user actions and information exposure and find that older versions of the official Twitter apps follow a privacy-invasive policy of including precise GPS coordinates in the metadata of tweets that users have geotagged at a coarse-grained level (e.g., city). The implications of this exposure are further exacerbated by our finding that users are considerably privacy-cautious in regards to exposing precise location data. When users can explicitly select what location data is published, there is a 94.6% reduction in tweets with GPS coordinates. As part of current efforts to give users more control over their data, LPAuditor can be adopted by major services and offered as an auditing tool that informs users about sensitive information they (indirectly) expose through location metadata.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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