需求不确定的群体感知博弈:一种深度强化学习方法
Crowdsensing Game with Demand Uncertainties: A Deep Reinforcement Learning Approach
摘要:
目前,智能手机的爆炸性增长与强大的内置传感器,如GPS,加速度计,陀螺仪和摄像头,使设计人群传感应用程序成为可能,这创造了一个新的接口之间的人和生活环境。到目前为止,已经设计了各种移动众测应用程序,其中众包可以雇用移动用户(MU)来完成所需的感测任务。本文利用新兴的基于学习的技术来解决具有需求不确定性和用户隐私保护的群体感知博弈问题。首先,考虑用户资源约束和需求不确定性,设计了一种新的移动群体感知经济模型。其次,提出了一种基于Stackelberg博弈的激励机制,其中感知平台(SP)是领导者,MU是追随者。然后证明了Stackelberg均衡的存在唯一性,并给出了计算Stackelberg均衡的步骤。在此基础上,提出了一种基于深度强化学习(DRL)方法的动态激励机制(DIM),使SP在不知道MU私有信息的情况下,直接从博弈经验中学习最优定价策略.最后,数值模拟来评估所提出的机制和方法的性能和理论特性。
英文摘要:
Currently, explosive increase of smartphones with powerful built-in sensors such as GPS, accelerometers, gyroscopes and cameras has made the design of crowdsensing applications possible, which create a new interface between human beings and life environment. Until now, various mobile crowdsensing applications have been designed, where the crowdsourcers can employ mobile users (MUs) to complete the required sensing tasks. In this paper, emerging learning-based techniques are leveraged to address crowdsensing game with demand uncertainties and private information protection of MUs. Firstly, a novel economic model for mobile crowdsensing is designed, which takes MUs' resources constraints and demand uncertainties into consideration. Secondly, an incentive mechanism based on Stackelberg game is provided, where the sensing-platform (SP) is the leader and the MUs are the followers. Then, the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) is proven and the procedure for computing the SE is given. Furthermore, a dynamic incentive mechanism (DIM) based on deep reinforcement learning (DRL) approach is investigated without knowing the private information of the MUs. It enables the SP to learn the optimal pricing strategy directly from game experience without any prior knowledge about MUs' information. Finally, numerical simulations are implemented to evaluate the performance and theoretical properties of the proposed mechanism and approach.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。