Wave:一类新的基于码的陷门单向原像采样函数
Wave: A New Family of Trapdoor One-Way Preimage Sampleable Functions Based on Codes
摘要:
我们在这里提出了一个新的家庭陷门单向原像采样函数(PSF)的基础上的代码,波PSF家庭。陷门函数在两个计算假设下是单向的:高权重的通用解码的困难性和广义$(U,U+V)$码的不可重构性。我们的证明遵循GPV策略[GPV 08]。通过包括拒绝采样,我们确保陷门逆输出的正确分布。我们的家庭的域采样属性,确保通过使用和证明的变体的剩余哈希引理。我们用三元广义$(U,U+V)$ -码实例化新的Wave-PSF族,设计了一个在随机预言机模型下实现自适应选择消息攻击(EUF-CMA)下存在不可伪造的“散列-签名”签名方案.对于128位的经典安全性,签名大小为15000位的量级,公钥大小为4兆字节的量级,并且拒绝率被限制为每10到12个签名拒绝一次。
英文摘要:
We present here a new family of trapdoor one-way Preimage Sampleable Functions (PSF) based on codes, the Wave-PSF family. The trapdoor function is one-way under two computational assumptions: the hardness of generic decoding for high weights and the indistinguishability of generalized $(U,U+V)$-codes. Our proof follows the GPV strategy [GPV08]. By including rejection sampling, we ensure the proper distribution for the trapdoor inverse output. The domain sampling property of our family is ensured by using and proving a variant of the left-over hash lemma. We instantiate the new Wave-PSF family with ternary generalized $(U,U+V)$-codes to design a "hash-and-sign" signature scheme which achieves existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA) in the random oracle model. For 128 bits of classical security, signature sizes are in the order of 15 thousand bits, the public key size in the order of 4 megabytes, and the rejection rate is limited to one rejection every 10 to 12 signatures.
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