公平竞争:波士顿机制中具有粗糙优先级结构的真诚而老练的参与者
Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority Structure
摘要:
谁会从一个可操纵的择校机制中获益,谁会因此而受损?研究结果的真诚和复杂的学生下的可操纵的波士顿机制相比,战略证明延期接受,我们提供了强大的“任何事情”定理的大型随机市场粗优先级结构。也就是说,有许多真诚而老练的学生更喜欢波士顿机制而不是延期录取,反之亦然。有些人甚至可以从真诚中受益(如果也被认为是这样)。我们的研究结果调和以前的理论和已知的实证结果之间的定性差异。最后,我们通过研究市场力量,可以影响这些机制之间的选择。
英文摘要:
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school-choice mechanism? Studying the outcomes of sincere and sophisticated students under the manipulable Boston Mechanism as compared with the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance, we provide robust "anything-goes" theorems for large random markets with coarse priority structures. I.e., there are many sincere and sophisticated students who prefer the Boston Mechanism to Deferred Acceptance, and vice versa. Some populations may even benefit from being sincere (if also perceived as such). Our findings reconcile qualitative differences between previous theory and known empirical results. We conclude by studying market forces that can influence the choice between these mechanisms.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。