在Bicomp中抵御自私的挖矿攻击
Resisting Selfish Mining Attacks in the Bicomp
摘要：
自私挖矿是对比特币网络完整性的攻击，由康奈尔大学研究人员Emin Gun Sirer和Ittay Eyal于2013年首次提出。自私挖矿攻击也存在于大多数Nakamoto共识协议中。一般来说，自私的挖掘策略可以构成一个中本聪共识系统，其挖掘能力不到整个系统的25%。我们已经讨论了如何Bicomp可以抵抗自私的挖掘在我们以前的论文“Bicomp：双层可扩展的Nakamoto共识协议”。在本技术报告中，我们详细推导了自私攻击者通过自私挖掘获得更多收入所应满足的条件。通过调整宏块难度和占用期长度，Bicomp协议对自私挖掘具有较强的抵抗能力。
英文摘要：
Selfish mining, which is an attack on the integrity of the Bitcoin network, was first proposed by Cornell researchers Emin Gun Sirer and Ittay Eyal in 2013. Selfish mining attack also exists in most Nakamoto consensus protocols. Generally speaking, selfish mining strategy can comprise a Nakamoto consensus system with less than 25% mining power of the whole system. We have discussed how the Bicomp can resist selfish mining in our former paper "Bicomp: A Bilayer Scalable Nakamoto Consensus Protocol". In this technical report, we give a detailed derivation on the conditions a selfish attacker should meet to earn more revenues through selfish mining. And we also get a conclusion that through adjusting macroblock difficulties together with tenure lengths, the Bicomp protocol has high resistant towards selfish mining.
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