Fidelius：保护用户机密免受浏览器攻击
Fidelius: Protecting User Secrets from Compromised Browsers
摘要：
用户经常在浏览器窗口中输入敏感数据，如密码、信用卡号或税务信息。虽然现代浏览器提供了强大的客户端隐私保护措施来保护这些数据，但这些防御措施都无法阻止被恶意软件入侵的浏览器窃取这些数据。在这项工作中，我们提出了Fidelius，一种新的架构，该架构使用集成到浏览器中的可信硬件飞地来保护用户在Web浏览会话期间的秘密，即使整个底层浏览器和操作系统完全由恶意攻击者控制。Fidelius解决了在完全恶意的环境中为浏览器提供保护所涉及的许多挑战，为表单数据、JavaScript执行、XMLHttpRequests和受保护的Web存储提供完整性和隐私支持，同时最大限度地减少了TCB。此外，安全区与浏览器、键盘和显示器之间的交互都需要新的协议，每个协议都有自己的安全考虑。最后，Fidelius考虑到UI因素，以确保为开发人员和用户提供一致和简单的界面。作为该项目的一部分，我们开发了第一个开源系统，该系统提供了从输入和输出外围设备到硬件飞地的可信路径，而不依赖于额外的虚拟机管理程序安全假设。这些组成部分可能是独立的利益和有用的未来项目。我们实现和评估Fidelius来衡量其性能开销，发现Fidelius对安全页面的页面加载和用户交互施加了可接受的开销，并且对不使用其增强的安全功能的页面和页面组件没有影响。
英文摘要：
Users regularly enter sensitive data, such as passwords, credit card numbers, or tax information, into the browser window. While modern browsers provide powerful client-side privacy measures to protect this data, none of these defenses prevent a browser compromised by malware from stealing it. In this work, we present Fidelius, a new architecture that uses trusted hardware enclaves integrated into the browser to enable protection of user secrets during web browsing sessions, even if the entire underlying browser and OS are fully controlled by a malicious attacker. Fidelius solves many challenges involved in providing protection for browsers in a fully malicious environment, offering support for integrity and privacy for form data, JavaScript execution, XMLHttpRequests, and protected web storage, while minimizing the TCB. Moreover, interactions between the enclave and the browser, the keyboard, and the display all require new protocols, each with their own security considerations. Finally, Fidelius takes into account UI considerations to ensure a consistent and simple interface for both developers and users. As part of this project, we develop the first open source system that provides a trusted path from input and output peripherals to a hardware enclave with no reliance on additional hypervisor security assumptions. These components may be of independent interest and useful to future projects. We implement and evaluate Fidelius to measure its performance overhead, finding that Fidelius imposes acceptable overhead on page load and user interaction for secured pages and has no impact on pages and page components that do not use its enhanced security features.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
