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arXiv 1809.00317cs.NI
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车载通信中无线电资源的纠缠学习:不经意博弈论观点

Learning to Entangle Radio Resources in Vehicular Communications: An Oblivious Game-Theoretic Perspective

Xianfu Chen, Celimuge Wu, Mehdi Bennis, Zhifeng Zhao, Zhu Han

摘要:

研究了车对车通信网络中的非协作无线资源调度问题。技术挑战在于高车辆机动性和数据流量变化。在离散的调度时隙上,每个车辆用户设备(VUE)对与路边单元(RSU)的覆盖范围中的其他VUE对竞争有限的频率以发送排队的分组。RSU在每个时隙开始时的频率分配遵循密封的第二价格拍卖。每个VUE对都旨在优化预期的长期性能。VUE对之间的这种相互作用被建模为具有半连续全局网络状态空间的随机博弈。通过定义一个分区控制策略,我们将随机博弈转化为一个等价的具有有限大小的全局队列状态空间的博弈。我们采用一个不经意的均衡(OE)来近似马尔可夫完美均衡(MPE),它表征了等价博弈的最优解。从理论上证明了OE解具有渐近马尔可夫均衡性质。由于缺乏网络动力学的先验知识,我们推导出一个在线算法来学习OE策略。数值仿真验证了理论分析的正确性,表明了所提出的在线学习算法的有效性。

英文摘要:

This paper studies the problem of non-cooperative radio resource scheduling in a vehicle-to-vehicle communication network. The technical challenges lie in high vehicle mobility and data traffic variations. Over the discrete scheduling slots, each vehicle user equipment (VUE)-pair competes with other VUE-pairs in the coverage of a road side unit (RSU) for the limited frequency to transmit queued packets. The frequency allocation at the beginning of each slot by the RSU is regulated following a sealed second-price auction. Each VUE-pair aims to optimize the expected long-term performance. Such interactions among VUE-pairs are modelled as a stochastic game with a semi-continuous global network state space. By defining a partitioned control policy, we transform the stochastic game into an equivalent game with a global queue state space of finite size. We adopt an oblivious equilibrium (OE) to approximate the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), which characterizes the optimal solution to the equivalent game. The OE solution is theoretically proven to be with an asymptotic Markov equilibrium property. Due to the lack of a priori knowledge of network dynamics, we derive an online algorithm to learn the OE policies. Numerical simulations validate the theoretical analysis and show the effectiveness of the proposed online learning algorithm.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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