朋友之间的小秘密算什么
What's a little leakage between friends?
摘要:
本文介绍了一种新的攻击最近的消息系统,保护通信元数据。主要的观察结果是,如果对手设法危及用户的朋友,它可以使用这个受损的朋友来了解有关用户其他正在进行的对话的信息。具体来说,对手了解用户是否正在发送其他消息,这为现有的交叉和泄露攻击打开了大门。为了正式证明这种妥协的朋友攻击,我们提出了一个抽象的方案,称为独家呼叫中心的问题,捕捉攻击的根本原因,并证明它是独立的特定设计或现有的元数据私人消息系统的实现。然后,我们引入一个新的原语,称为私人应答机,可以防止攻击。不幸的是,仅在计算难度假设下构建此原语的安全且有效的实例似乎是不可能的。相反,我们给出了一个构造,假设用户可以对他们的最大朋友数量进行限制,并且可以泄露这些信息。
英文摘要:
This paper introduces a new attack on recent messaging systems that protect communication metadata. The main observation is that if an adversary manages to compromise a user's friend, it can use this compromised friend to learn information about the user's other ongoing conversations. Specifically, the adversary learns whether a user is sending other messages or not, which opens the door to existing intersection and disclosure attacks. To formalize this compromised friend attack, we present an abstract scenario called the exclusive call center problem that captures the attack's root cause, and demonstrates that it is independent of the particular design or implementation of existing metadata-private messaging systems. We then introduce a new primitive called a private answering machine that can prevent the attack. Unfortunately, building a secure and efficient instance of this primitive under only computational hardness assumptions does not appear possible. Instead, we give a construction under the assumption that users can place a bound on their maximum number of friends and are okay leaking this information.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。