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arXiv 1808.06579cs.ITmath.IT
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基于合同的LTE非许可信道激励机制

Contract-based Incentive Mechanism for LTE over Unlicensed Channels

Kenza Hamidouche, Walid Saad, Méroaune Debbah, My T. Thai, Zhu Han

摘要:

在本文中,一种新的经济的方法,合同理论的框架的基础上,提出了在蜂窝网络中的LTE非授权信道(LTE-U)提供激励。在该模型中,移动网络运营商(MNO)设计并向用户提供一组合同,以激励他们接受在未授权频带上被服务。一个实用的模型中,每个用户所需的服务质量(QoS)的信息是不知道的MNO和其他用户,被认为是。在此契约模型下,推导了移动运营商对每个用户收取的价格的封闭表达式,并将频谱分配问题归结为一个不完全信息的匹配博弈问题。对于匹配问题,提出了一种分布式算法,将用户分配到授权和非授权频谱。仿真结果表明,与不考虑用户需求的经典算法相比,所提出的定价机制可以将达到QoS要求的用户比例提高45%.此外,所提出的算法的性能在不完全信息的情况下,示出接近相同的机制与完全信息的性能。

英文摘要:

In this paper, a novel economic approach, based on the framework of contract theory, is proposed for providing incentives for LTE over unlicensed channels (LTE-U) in cellular-networks. In this model, a mobile network operator (MNO) designs and offers a set of contracts to the users to motivate them to accept being served over the unlicensed bands. A practical model in which the information about the quality-of-service (QoS) required by every user is not known to the MNO and other users, is considered. For this contractual model, the closed-form expression of the price charged by the MNO for every user is derived and the problem of spectrum allocation is formulated as a matching game with incomplete information. For the matching problem, a distributed algorithm is proposed to assign the users to the licensed and unlicensed spectra. Simulation results show that the proposed pricing mechanism can increase the fraction of users that achieve their QoS requirements by up to 45\% compared to classical algorithms that do not account for users requirements. Moreover, the performance of the proposed algorithm in the case of incomplete information is shown to approach the performance of the same mechanism with complete information.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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