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arXiv 1808.01708cs.CY
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光明之处:分析印度的网络审查机制

Where The Light Gets In: Analyzing Web Censorship Mechanisms in India

Tarun Kumar Yadav, Akshat Sinha, Devashish Gosain, Piyush Sharma, Sambuddho Chakravarty

摘要:

本文对印度的互联网审查制度进行了详细的研究。我们从各种公共来源汇总了一份可能被屏蔽的网站名单,以评估九家主要ISP使用的审查机制。首先,我们证明现有的审查检测工具,如OONI是非常不准确的。因此,我们开发了各种技术和方法来正确评估审查和研究这些ISP中涉及的潜在机制。在每一步,我们都手动验证了我们的发现,以测试我们方法的有效性,这一步在很大程度上被其他人忽略了。我们通过判断审查基础设施的覆盖范围和一致性来加强我们的发现,大致上是根据基础设施监视的网络路径和请求域的平均数量。我们的研究结果表明,互联网服务提供商之间存在明显的差异,他们如何安装审查基础设施。例如,在Idea网络中,我们在超过90%的测试AS内路径上观察到了挑剔的中间盒,而对于Vodafone,它低至2.5%。我们通过设计我们自己的新颖的反审查策略来结束我们的研究,这不依赖于第三方工具(如代理,Tor和VPN等)。我们成功地反审查了所有受测试的ISP中所有被封锁的网站。

英文摘要:

This paper presents a detailed study of the Internet censorship in India. We consolidated a list of potentially blocked websites from various public sources to assess censorship mechanisms used by nine major ISPs. To begin with, we demonstrate that existing censorship detection tools like OONI are grossly inaccurate. We thus developed various techniques and heuristics to correctly assess censorship and study the underlying mechanism involved in these ISPs. At every step we corroborated our finding manually to test the efficacy of our approach, a step largely ignored by others. We fortify our findings by adjudging the coverage and consistency of censorship infrastructure, broadly in terms of average number of network paths and requested domains the infrastructure surveils. Our results indicate a clear disparity among the ISPs, on how they install censorship infrastructure. For instance, in Idea network we observed the censorious middleboxes on over 90% of our tested intra-AS paths whereas for Vodafone, it is as low as 2.5%. We conclude our research by devising our own novel anti-censorship strategies, that does not depend on third party tools (like proxies, Tor and VPNs etc.). We managed to anti-censor all blocked websites in all ISPs under test.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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