股份奖励分享计划
Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools
摘要:
我们介绍并研究了奖励共享方案(RSS),该方案在涉及大量利益相关者的协作项目中促进{ \em权益池}\的公平形成,例如维护权益证明(PoS)区块链。我们的机制是由所需的池数的目标值参数化。我们表明,通过适当的激励参与者,所需的股份池的数量是一个纳什均衡所产生的理性发挥。我们的均衡还表现出效率/安全性的权衡,通过一个参数,包括池之间校准最小的成本和提供保护,防止Sybil攻击,设置一个单一的利益相关者创建了大量的池,希望主导的合作项目。然后,我们描述了如何在PoS设置中部署RSS,减轻一些潜在的部署攻击和协议偏差,包括审查交易,执行Sybil攻击以控制大多数股份,谎报实际成本等。最后,我们通过实验证明了在动态环境中,玩家在无限期的互动游戏中对彼此的战略举措做出反应,从而快速收敛到均衡。我们还展示了简单的奖励分享计划,似乎更“公平”,也许违反直觉,集中均衡收敛。
英文摘要:
We introduce and study reward sharing schemes (RSS) that promote the fair formation of {\em stake pools}\ in collaborative projects that involve a large number of stakeholders such as the maintenance of a proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain. Our mechanisms are parameterized by a target value for the desired number of pools. We show that by properly incentivizing participants, the desired number of stake pools is a Nash equilibrium arising from rational play. Our equilibria also exhibit an efficiency / security tradeoff via a parameter that calibrates between including pools with the smallest cost and providing protection against Sybil attacks, the setting where a single stakeholder creates a large number of pools in the hopes to dominate the collaborative project. We then describe how RSS can be deployed in the PoS setting, mitigating a number of potential deployment attacks and protocol deviations that include censoring transactions, performing Sybil attacks with the objective to control the majority of stake, lying about the actual cost and others. Finally, we experimentally demonstrate fast convergence to equilibria in dynamic environments where players react to each other's strategic moves over an indefinite period of interactive play. We also show how simple reward sharing schemes that are seemingly more "fair", perhaps counterintuitively, converge to centralized equilibria.
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