超越期望:作为一般决策理论的随机优势
Exceeding Expectations: Stochastic Dominance as a General Decision Theory
摘要:
理性主体应该最大化期望效用或选择价值的原则在许多不确定性下的普通决策情况下直观上是合理的。但在极端、低概率风险的情况下(如帕斯卡的抢劫案),它就不那么可信了,而在圣彼得堡和帕萨迪纳奥运会这样的情况下,它就令人难以忍受地自相矛盾了。在本文中,我表明,在一定的条件下,随机优势推理可以捕捉到大多数的合理影响的预期推理,同时避免其陷阱。具体来说,如果一个人的选择的价值有足够的背景不确定性,那么许多期望最大化的赌博,如果不是随机地在“真空“中支配他们的选择,就会因为背景的不确定性而成为随机地支配。但是,即使在这些条件下,随机优势也不会要求代理人接受那些预期优势取决于极端回报概率足够小的期权。这些结果所依赖的背景不确定性,对于任何一个部分地通过结果世界中的总价值来衡量其选择价值的主体来说,似乎是不可避免的。至少对于这样的主体来说,随机优势提供了一个在不确定性下选择的貌似合理的一般原则,它可以解释比以前认识到的更多的对这种选择的明显理性约束。
英文摘要:
The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk (like Pascal's Mugging), and intolerably paradoxical in cases like the St. Petersburg and Pasadena games. In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, stochastic dominance reasoning can capture most of the plausible implications of expectational reasoning while avoiding most of its pitfalls. Specifically, given sufficient background uncertainty about the choiceworthiness of one's options, many expectation-maximizing gambles that do not stochastically dominate their alternatives "in a vacuum" become stochastically dominant in virtue of that background uncertainty. But, even under these conditions, stochastic dominance will not require agents to accept options whose expectational superiority depends on sufficiently small probabilities of extreme payoffs. The sort of background uncertainty on which these results depend looks unavoidable for any agent who measures the choiceworthiness of her options in part by the total amount of value in the resulting world. At least for such agents, then, stochastic dominance offers a plausible general principle of choice under uncertainty that can explain more of the apparent rational constraints on such choices than has previously been recognized.
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