复杂网格攻击的随机防御
Stochastic defense against complex grid attacks
摘要：
我们描述的防御机制，旨在检测复杂的网格攻击，涉及物理动作（包括负载修改）和传感器输出更改，后者以稀疏的方式进行，并考虑到网格响应机制（二次响应）。这些攻击的目标是即使在全AC功率流模型下也无法检测到，并隐藏设备过载。我们证明，这样的攻击，虽然可能难以实现，但很容易计算，即使在系统上安装了大量的传感器，并可以在静态设置，成功地隐藏大型线路过载。此外，理解传感器信号的持续随机性质的攻击者可以扩展攻击，以便在非平凡的时间段内保持有效。为了对抗这种“理想”或“完美”的攻击，我们展示了一组数据驱动的随机技术来挫败攻击者，并检测攻击已经发生。
英文摘要：
We describe defense mechanisms designed to detect sophisticated grid attacks involving both physical actions (including load modification) and sensor output alteration, with the latter performed in a sparse manner and also so as to take into account grid response mechanisms (secondary response). The attacks aim to be both undetectable even under a full AC power flow model, and to hide equipment overload. We demonstrate that such attacks, while perhaps difficult to implement, nevertheless are easily computed even on systems with a large number of installed sensors, and can, in a static setting, successfuly hide large line overloads. Furthermore an attacker that understands the ongoing stochastic nature of sensor signals can extend the attack so as to remain effective for a nontrivial time period. To counteract such "ideal" or "perfect" attacks, we demonstrate a set of data-driven stochastic techniques to thwart the attacker and detect that an attack has taken place.
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