改变一个人的思想的数学,通过杰弗里的或通过珍珠的更新规则
The Mathematics of Changing one's Mind, via Jeffrey's or via Pearl's update rule
摘要:
概率推理中的证据可能是“硬”或“软”的,也就是说,它可能是是/否的形式,或者它可能涉及单位区间[0,1]中的信念强度。在许多情况下,使用软[0,1]值证据进行推理是很重要的,但可能会导致不同的、令人困惑的解释。本文旨在通过将现有的焦点从软证据的规范转移到软证据的适应,为该领域带来更多的数学和概念清晰度。有两种主要的方法,被称为杰弗里规则和珀尔方法;它们在软证据上给出了不同的结果。本文认为,它们可以理解为纠正和改进。它描述了这两种方法作为软证据更新的不同方式,突出了它们的差异,相似之处和应用。这个帐户是基于一种新的基于通道的方法贝叶斯概率。正确理解这两种更新机制与推理、决策工具和概率程序设计语言高度相关。
英文摘要:
Evidence in probabilistic reasoning may be 'hard' or 'soft', that is, it may be of yes/no form, or it may involve a strength of belief, in the unit interval [0, 1]. Reasoning with soft, [0, 1]-valued evidence is important in many situations but may lead to different, confusing interpretations. This paper intends to bring more mathematical and conceptual clarity to the field by shifting the existing focus from specification of soft evidence to accomodation of soft evidence. There are two main approaches, known as Jeffrey's rule and Pearl's method; they give different outcomes on soft evidence. This paper argues that they can be understood as correction and as improvement. It describes these two approaches as different ways of updating with soft evidence, highlighting their differences, similarities and applications. This account is based on a novel channel-based approach to Bayesian probability. Proper understanding of these two update mechanisms is highly relevant for inference, decision tools and probabilistic programming languages.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。