战略沟通的信息论限度
Information-Theoretic Limits of Strategic Communication
摘要：
在这篇文章中，我们研究了策略信息在噪声信道中的传输。在沟通渠道完善的情况下，这一问题在经济学中得到了广泛的研究。与信息论不同，编码器和解码器都有不同的目标，并相应地选择他们的编码和解码策略。这种方法从根本上不同于传统的通信范式，传统的通信范式假设发射机有两种类型：要么它们有一个共同的目标，要么它们充当对手，例如干扰机，窃听器。我们制定了一个点对点的源信道编码问题的状态信息，其中的编码器和解码器选择各自的编码和解码策略，以最大限度地提高他们的长期效用函数。这个战略编码问题是在Wyner-Ziv的场景和Kamenica-Gentzkow的贝叶斯说服游戏之间的相互作用。我们刻画了一个单字母的解决方案，我们将它与以前的结果，通过使用凹化方法。这确认了即使解码过程不受监督（例如，当解码器是自主设备时）也发送编码数据比特的益处。我们的解决方案有两个有趣的特点：它可能是最佳的不使用所有的通道资源;信息内容影响编码过程，因为效用函数捕获源符号的偏好。
英文摘要：
In this article, we investigate strategic information transmission over a noisy channel. This problem has been widely investigated in Economics, when the communication channel is perfect. Unlike in Information Theory, both encoder and decoder have distinct objectives and choose their encoding and decoding strategies accordingly. This approach radically differs from the conventional Communication paradigm, which assumes transmitters are of two types: either they have a common goal, or they act as opponent, e.g. jammer, eavesdropper. We formulate a point-to-point source-channel coding problem with state information, in which the encoder and the decoder choose their respective encoding and decoding strategies in order to maximize their long-run utility functions. This strategic coding problem is at the interplay between Wyner-Ziv's scenario and the Bayesian persuasion game of Kamenica-Gentzkow. We characterize a single-letter solution and we relate it to the previous results by using the concavification method. This confirms the benefit of sending encoded data bits even if the decoding process is not supervised, e.g. when the decoder is an autonomous device. Our solution has two interesting features: it might be optimal not to use all channel resources; the informational content impacts the encoding process, since utility functions capture preferences on source symbols.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
