监督控制系统中攻击类别的检测与缓解
Detection and Mitigation of Classes of Attacks in Supervisory Control Systems
AI总结：
本文研究了监督控制系统中网络攻击的检测与缓解，提出了一种防御策略，通过在线检测攻击并禁用可控事件，同时开发算法验证系统是否能防止攻击造成的损害。
摘要：
控制系统的网络连接部署使其反馈控制系统对网络攻击变得脆弱。本文研究了监督控制系统中的入侵检测与缓解问题，其中攻击者有能力启用或禁用易受攻击的执行器命令，并删除或插入易受攻击的传感器读数。我们为特定类型的执行器启用攻击、传感器删除攻击或传感器插入攻击建立了数学模型。然后提出了一种防御策略，旨在在线检测此类攻击并在检测到攻击后禁用所有可控事件。我们开发了算法程序，用于验证系统是否能防止由所提出防御策略考虑的攻击造成的损害，其中损害被建模为预定义不安全系统状态的可达性。在此背景下感兴趣的必要且充分的技术条件，称为
英文摘要：
The deployment of control systems with network-connected components has made feedback control systems vulnerable to attacks over the network. This paper considers the problem of intrusion detection and mitigation in supervisory control systems, where the attacker has the ability to enable or disable vulnerable actuator commands and erase or insert vulnerable sensor readings. We present a mathematical model for the system under certain classes of actuator enablement attacks, sensor erasure attacks, or sensor insertion attacks. We then propose a defense strategy that aims to detect such attacks online and disables all controllable events after an attack is detected. We develop an algorithmic procedure for verifying whether the system can prevent damage from the attacks considered with the proposed defense strategy, where damage is modeled as the reachability of a pre-defined set of unsafe system states.The technical condition of interest that is necessary and sufficient in this context, termed "GF-safe controllability", is characterized. We show that the verification of GF-safe controllability can be performed using diagnoser or verifier automata. Finally, we illustrate the methodology with a traffic control system example.
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