基于三值模型划分的机密推理
Confidential Inference via Ternary Model Partitioning
摘要:
当今的云计算供应商正在竞相提供各种产品,以简化和加速AI服务部署。然而,云用户总是担心他们的运行时数据的机密性,这些数据应该在第三方的计算基础设施上处理。用户提供的数据的信息披露可能会危及用户的隐私,并违反日益严格的数据保护法规。在本文中,我们系统地研究了深度学习图像分类管道中推理输入的生存周期,并了解了信息是如何泄露的。基于发现的见解,我们开发了一个三元模型分区机制,并带来可信的执行环境,以减轻识别的信息泄漏。我们的研究原型由两个合作组件组成:(1)模型评估框架,一个本地模型评估和分区工具,帮助云用户进行部署准备;(2)Infenclave,一个基于飞地的模型服务系统,用于云中的在线机密推理。我们对三个具有代表性的具有不同网络深度和架构复杂度的ImageNet级深度学习模型进行了全面的安全性和性能评估。我们的研究结果证明了在云中推出机密推理服务的可行性,并具有最大的机密性保证和较低的性能成本。
英文摘要:
Today's cloud vendors are competing to provide various offerings to simplify and accelerate AI service deployment. However, cloud users always have concerns about the confidentiality of their runtime data, which are supposed to be processed on third-party's compute infrastructures. Information disclosure of user-supplied data may jeopardize users' privacy and breach increasingly stringent data protection regulations. In this paper, we systematically investigate the life cycles of inference inputs in deep learning image classification pipelines and understand how the information could be leaked. Based on the discovered insights, we develop a Ternary Model Partitioning mechanism and bring trusted execution environments to mitigate the identified information leakages. Our research prototype consists of two co-operative components: (1) Model Assessment Framework, a local model evaluation and partitioning tool that assists cloud users in deployment preparation; (2) Infenclave, an enclave-based model serving system for online confidential inference in the cloud. We have conducted comprehensive security and performance evaluation on three representative ImageNet-level deep learning models with different network depths and architectural complexity. Our results demonstrate the feasibility of launching confidential inference services in the cloud with maximized confidentiality guarantees and low performance costs.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。