平方和满足纳什均衡:寻找均衡的最优下界
Sum-of-Squares meets Nash: Optimal Lower Bounds for Finding any Equilibrium
摘要:
一些作品已经显示出无条件的硬度(通过完整性差距)的计算平衡使用强层次的凸松弛。然而,这样的结果只适用于计算优化某个目标函数的均衡的问题,而不适用于寻找\emph{any}均衡的(可以说是更基本的)任务。我们提出了一个算法模型的基础上的平方和(SoS)的层次结构,允许逃避这种固有的局限性的完整性差距。在这个模型中,算法只通过一个放松的解决方案,自然的SoS松弛计算均衡访问输入游戏。然后,他们可以自适应地构造候选解决方案的列表,并调用验证oracle来检查列表中的任何候选方案是否是解决方案。该模型捕获了大多数经过充分研究的近似算法,例如最大割、稀疏割和唯一游戏。用于计算两人n策略博弈中的精确和近似均衡的最新算法在该模型中被捕获,并且要求i)SoS松弛的大小(~运行时间)或ii)候选列表的大小中的至少一个分别至少为$2^{Ω(n)}$和$n^{Ω(\log{(n)})}$。我们的主要结果显示了一个下限,该下限与这些上限相匹配,直至指数中的常数因子。这可以被解释为一个无条件的确认,在我们的限制算法框架,鲁宾斯坦最近的条件硬度\cite{Rub}计算近似平衡。我们的证明策略包括构建一个游戏族,所有游戏都共享一个共同的平方和解,但一个游戏的每个(近似)均衡都远离家族中任何其他游戏的每个(近似)均衡。
英文摘要:
Several works have shown unconditional hardness (via integrality gaps) of computing equilibria using strong hierarchies of convex relaxations. Such results however only apply to the problem of computing equilibria that optimize a certain objective function and not to the (arguably more fundamental) task of finding \emph{any} equilibrium. We present an algorithmic model based on the sum-of-squares (SoS) hierarchy that allows escaping this inherent limitation of integrality gaps. In this model, algorithms access the input game only through a relaxed solution to the natural SoS relaxation for computing equilibria. They can then adaptively construct a list of candidate solutions and invoke a verification oracle to check if any candidate on the list is a solution. This model captures most well-studied approximation algorithms such as those for Max-Cut, Sparsest Cut, and Unique-Games. The state-of-the-art algorithms for computing exact and approximate equilibria in two-player, n-strategy games are captured in this model and require that at least one of i) size (~ running time) of the SoS relaxation or ii) the size of the list of candidates, be at least $2^{Ω(n)}$ and $n^{Ω(\log{(n)})}$ respectively. Our main result shows a lower bound that matches these upper bound up to constant factors in the exponent. This can be interpreted as an unconditional confirmation, in our restricted algorithmic framework, of Rubinstein's recent conditional hardness \cite{Rub} for computing approximate equilibria. Our proof strategy involves constructing a family of games that all share a common sum-of-squares solution but every (approximate) equilibrium of one game is far from every (approximate) equilibrium of any other game in the family.
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