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arXiv 1806.07409cs.CVcs.LGstat.ML
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内置的易受不可察觉的对抗性扰动的漏洞

Built-in Vulnerabilities to Imperceptible Adversarial Perturbations

University College London(伦敦大学学院)

Thomas Tanay, Jerone T. A. Andrews, Lewis D. Griffin

摘要:

设计对输入的微小对抗性扰动具有鲁棒性的模型已被证明是非常困难的。在这项工作中,我们表明,相反的问题--使模型更脆弱--是令人惊讶的容易。在提出了一些关于MNIST的概念证明之后,我们引入了一种通用的倾斜攻击,该攻击通过增加预训练网络对训练数据中低方差分量的敏感性,在不影响其在测试数据上的性能的情况下,将漏洞注入到预训练网络的线性层中。我们说明了这种攻击的多层感知器上训练SVHN和使用它来设计一个独立的对抗模块,我们称之为隐写解码器。最后,我们在CIFAR-10上表明,中毒率低至0.1%的中毒攻击可以在最先进的网络中诱导对所选不可感知后门信号的漏洞。除了它们的实际意义,这些不同的结果揭示了对抗性例子现象的本质。

英文摘要:

Designing models that are robust to small adversarial perturbations of their inputs has proven remarkably difficult. In this work we show that the reverse problem---making models more vulnerable---is surprisingly easy. After presenting some proofs of concept on MNIST, we introduce a generic tilting attack that injects vulnerabilities into the linear layers of pre-trained networks by increasing their sensitivity to components of low variance in the training data without affecting their performance on test data. We illustrate this attack on a multilayer perceptron trained on SVHN and use it to design a stand-alone adversarial module which we call a steganogram decoder. Finally, we show on CIFAR-10 that a poisoning attack with a poisoning rate as low as 0.1% can induce vulnerabilities to chosen imperceptible backdoor signals in state-of-the-art networks. Beyond their practical implications, these different results shed new light on the nature of the adversarial example phenomenon.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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