arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1806.06266cs.GTcs.AIcs.LGstat.ML
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论防策略性会议同行评议

On Strategyproof Conference Peer Review

Carnegie Mellon University(卡内基梅隆大学)

Yichong Xu, Han Zhao, Xiaofei Shi, Jeremy Zhang, Nihar B. Shah

摘要:

我们考虑在会议环境中进行同行评议,在这种环境中,通常在评审者和作者之间存在重叠。这种重叠可以激励战略评论影响自己论文的最终排名。在这项工作中,我们通过社会选择的镜头来解决这个问题,并提出了一个理论框架,为strategyproof和有效的同行评议。我们首先提出并分析了一个算法的审稿人分配和聚合,保证strategyproofness和一个自然的效率属性称为quickity,当作者图满足一个简单的属性。我们的算法是基于所谓的分区方法,可以被认为是这种方法的推广会议同行评审设置。然后,我们的经验表明,必要的属性的作者图确实是满足从ICLR会议的提交数据,并进一步展示了一个简单的技巧,使分区方法更实际的呼吁会议同行评审。最后,我们补充我们的积极结果与负面的理论结果,我们证明,在各种方式的加强要求,这是不可能的任何算法是strategyproof和有效的。

英文摘要:

We consider peer review in a conference setting where there is typically an overlap between the set of reviewers and the set of authors. This overlap can incentivize strategic reviews to influence the final ranking of one's own papers. In this work, we address this problem through the lens of social choice, and present a theoretical framework for strategyproof and efficient peer review. We first present and analyze an algorithm for reviewer-assignment and aggregation that guarantees strategyproofness and a natural efficiency property called unanimity, when the authorship graph satisfies a simple property. Our algorithm is based on the so-called partitioning method, and can be thought as a generalization of this method to conference peer review settings. We then empirically show that the requisite property on the authorship graph is indeed satisfied in the submission data from the ICLR conference, and further demonstrate a simple trick to make the partitioning method more practically appealing for conference peer review. Finally, we complement our positive results with negative theoretical results where we prove that under various ways of strengthening the requirements, it is impossible for any algorithm to be strategyproof and efficient.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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